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Abstract:  This paper explores the interplay between politics and ideology within the context of 
American expansion in the Late Jacksonian Era (1840s and 1850s).  This paper seeks to 
understand the role of a younger generation of Democrats in changing the Democratic Party and 
the Second Party System as the United States expanded territorially and, unbeknownst to them, 
careened towards disunion and civil war.  Of particular importance is the conception of a term 
which is synonymous with American expansion, Manifest Destiny.  Rather than rehashing prior 
arguments about Manifest Destiny‟s ideological importance, this thesis goes an alternate route.  
It reframes Manifest Destiny as a paradoxical idea: simultaneously it served as a vague 
nationalism espoused by younger Democrats as a tool to achieve party unity on expansion and as 
the progenitor of the sectional conflict which culminated in secession and the Civil War.   
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Let us suppose that Manifest Destiny is debatable – what then?  If such a question seems 
strange, it is because the historical debate on the hegemony of Manifest Destiny has been 
lacking.  The prevailing historical view identifies Manifest Destiny as a unifying political 
framework that allowed the United States to understand its expansion and establishment as a 
transcontinental power.  Anders Stephanson summed up this view by defining Manifest Destiny 
as “a particular (and particularly powerful) nationalism constituting itself not only as prophetic 
but also universal….of single importance in the way the United States came to understand itself 
in the world.”1  Such a view that Manifest Destiny was the hegemonic ideal for the nation and its 
self-perception does not explain the sectional crisis which grew out of division and debate on 
expansionist endeavors: annexing Texas, fixing the Oregon boundary, fighting the Mexican War, 
and seeking to acquire Cuba.  The problem of claiming the United States derived self-
understanding through Manifest Destiny is the assumption of unity within the nation or the 
parties.  But contrary to these assumptions, the Whigs never embraced Manifest Destiny and 
eventually denounced it as a license to steal another‟s land.2  Democrats repeatedly struggled to 
unite on expansion and did so only after intense wrangling.  Indeed, the sectional crisis seems to 
affirm Frederick Merk‟s quip that Manifest Destiny was “a bomb wrapped in idealism.”3  Yet 
Merk‟s thesis that a minority foisted Manifest Destiny on the majority has shortcomings as well.  
Continental expansion did occur, and a young coterie within the Democratic Party worked as a 
vanguard to make expansion a national issue. 
This paper attempts to explain Manifest Destiny‟s rise and fall from 1844 to 1861 by 
focusing on the role of that coterie, a younger generation of Democrats who took the name 
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Young America.  Geographically, these Democrats primarily came from the northwest although 
there were a few southerners.  The most prominent of them were Illinois‟ Sydney Breese and 
James Shields, Indiana‟s Edward Hannegan and Jesse Bright, and Ohio‟s William Allen.  
Florida‟s David Yulee and Louisiana‟s Pierre Soulé were the notable southerners.  Illinois‟ 
Stephen Douglas, the rising star and eventual party chieftain, served as the group‟s figurehead.  
These Democrats were born around the time of the disastrous War of 1812 and had no 
recollection of the sectionalist Missouri Compromise debates of 1820.
4
  Their nationalist vision 
partly originated from their lack of anxieties (held by the older generation) about the nation‟s 
fragility, imperiled by external threats and internal tensions.  Young Democrats constructed 
Manifest Destiny as an ideology by equating nationalism with freedom and democracy while 
linking both to regeneration through territorial expansion.  This nationalist vision served as a 
critique of the Whig economic program of economic nationalism directed by the federal 
government that included a national bank, tariffs, and internal improvements (infrastructure 
development) which Jacksonians had fought for years.  Yet, it is precisely that critique that led to 
an intergenerational clash within the Democracy.  Jacksonians clung to Jefferson‟s vision of a 
yeoman farmer republic free from tyranny, whether from the federal government or bankers.  
Young Democrats embraced free development in a broad negative sense: free trade, free 
movement into space, and freedom of independent qualitative development which would 
overcome agrarianism.  The maximization of private actors‟ interests, those of individuals, 
businesses, and political groups within the Union, would strengthen the nation by developing the 
egalitarian resource of land.  The generational conflict over revising Democratic positions and 
adopting new ones found a tenuous and dangerous resolution in an emerging idea of nationalism.   
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Manifest Destiny was the ideological means to a political end.  It used lofty, if vague 
ideals, to bridge the divide between Jacksonians and young Democrats in order to achieve 
specific aims of expansion.  Neither generational wing of the Democracy desired the federal 
government to control access to land and dictate its usages because such a program would 
invariably evolve towards class hierarchy.  By acquiring land for open development, the 
Democratic alliance of Southern planters and Northern plain republicans could regenerate itself 
and blunt Whig efforts to institute their own economic plan.  The ideological component for 
securing party unity involved defining Manifest Destiny in hegemonic terms: expansion was 
inevitable and had national support.  The Whigs‟ rejection of such an idea subsequently fostered 
Democratic unity.  The Democracy became the party of the nation‟s destiny, expansion across 
the continent, while the Whigs became the party of class.  If young Democrats seemed “long on 
bombast and short on specifics” as Stephanson claims, this was largely by design and the power 
of a strong opposition should not be underestimated.
5
  Those who lived through the harrowing 
Missouri Compromise debates in 1820 knew the sectionalism surrounding the incident exploded 
at a time when the Federalist Party had all but vanished.  With the Whigs committed against 
expansion and to their economic program, young Democrats and Jacksonians had to cooperate in 
order to effectively combat the Whigs.
6
  Vagaries and bombast about the nation‟s destiny seemed 
a safe and useful means to unite the Democratic Party and pursue an anti-Whig agenda. 
Yet, Young America encountered two problems by working in the vanguard.  First, they 
remained a minority within the party: expansionist votes were close partly for this reason.  
Jacksonians did not desire to reenact the Missouri Compromise debates, and the sectionalism that 
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expansionist debates unleashed revealed the danger of expansion.  Indeed, Manifest Destiny 
proved a paradox because of its rhetoric of freedom and democracy while simultaneously 
expanding free and slave territory.  Manifest Destiny could only veil, not eradicate, sectional 
divisions rooted in conflicts over slavery.  Finessing the slavery issue meant separating territorial 
aggrandizement from expanding one section‟s interest at the other‟s expense: the manifest 
destiny to spread freedom and democracy across North America did not concern slavery.  
Moreover, such nationalist bombast masked sectionalism by displacing sectional tensions onto 
an external other; aristocratic Britons, mixed-race Mexicans, or Catholic Spaniards.  The 
immediate goal of possessing the continent was realized, but not the ultimate goals of forging a 
nation through continental expansion and understanding such a project in nation building.  
Secession revealed how little Young America and Manifest Destiny had achieved besides adding 
land to the Union.
7
 
Prologue: The Blessings of Union 
“And I will make thy seed to multiply as the stars of Heaven, and will give unto thy seed all these 
countries; and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed.” Genesis 26:4 
James Polk‟s inauguration on March 4, 1845 served as a coda to a contentious period of 
national and Congressional debate on the annexation of Texas.  Whigs denounced annexation as 
a typical Democratic distraction from economic policy, such as internal improvements, while 
Democrats sneered at Whigs‟ attempts to deny common people access to land.  The rhetoric 
incorporated a sectional dimension last witnessed in 1820 even though partisanship persisted.  
Northern Whigs decried annexation as a slave owner‟s land grab, while Southern Democrats 
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retorted about the South‟s equal rights to land.  Despite the persistence of party loyalties, the 
vitriol spewed in Congress alarmed Polk.  In his inaugural address, Polk reprimanded those who 
questioned the “glorious Union” and its value:  
No treason to mankind since the organization of society would be equal in atrocity to that 
of him who would lift his hand to destroy it…He would stop the progress of free 
government and involve his country in either anarchy or despotism.  He would extinguish 




Polk‟s nationalistic appeal seemed similar to Daniel Webster‟s famous dictum “Liberty and 
Union, now and forever, one and inseparable”, Union as synonymous with freedom.9  Freedom 
was the Union‟s foundation and guaranteed by American democratic institutions.  Yet the parties 
viewed freedom and nationalism, however much interlinked, differently even as both ideas fit 
within the context of the Second Party System.  From its birth in 1828 until 1844, the party 
system flourished as Democrats and Whigs established strong bisectional constituencies by 
focusing on economics.  The adage “liberty for all and special privileges for none” encapsulated 
Democrats‟ negative vision.10  Democrats desired freedom from government intervention with 
the inherent premise that the Union, with its democratic superstructure, guaranteed such 
freedom.  Furthermore this freedom did not require improvement, just recapitulation for which 
land provided the mechanism while encouraging private development that would improve the 
whole nation.  In contrast, the Whigs saw freedom as subordinate to positive economic 
development.  Only strong structures such as national banks and infrastructure directed by the 
federal government could forge one economy and one nation from the Union‟s geographic 
vastness.  The Whig vision assumed the nation required perfecting through intensive 
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development of the Union as it existed.  For the Whigs, territorial expansion and recapitulation 
implied the nation would remain provincial in identity because of disparate interests, such as 
Southern slavery, and thus remain disunited.  The politics of expansion re-structured late 
Jacksonian politics around two fundamental questions.  What did adding land mean, and to 
whom?  Upon and through the issue of expansion, sectionalism supplanted the Second Party 
System. 
Chapter 1: Ascension 
“A star shall rise out of Jacob and a scepter shall spring up from Israel.” Numbers 24:1711 
New Frontier: the Annexation of Texas as the First Conflict- Expansion Part I, 1844-1845 
Historians consider the annexation of Texas to be the start of the Second Party System‟s 
disintegration as sectional tensions, held at bay since the Missouri Compromise of 1820, re-
appeared.  The question of slavery‟s expansion became a focal point of the debate after John 
Calhoun, South Carolina‟s towering intellectual and pro-slavery ultra, forced the issue as 
President John Tyler‟s Secretary of State.  The introduction of the slavery issue marked the 
annexation of Texas with intraparty struggle to forge and maintain unity in spite of the sectional 
logic inherent in any defense of or attack upon slavery.  To that end, political power more than 
anything was at stake in the annexation struggle.  The Whigs opposed adding territory because it 
diluted the power of existing states by expanding representation in Congress, and their unity in 
opposition held until the final vote.
12
  The Democrats initially split along sectional lines but 
managed to unify after months of argumentation, particularly within the press, spurred on by the 
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presidential election of 1844.  Democratic consensus for annexation rested upon a questionable 
argument, so important in later debates, that expansion increased land available to free 
Americans to cultivate independently for theirs and the nation‟s benefit.  This argument, 
beginning with the Texas struggle, would define later expansionist debates.  Moreover, it 
introduced a new ideology based upon expansion.   
By changing the justification for annexation, Calhoun nearly prevented it.  His 
predecessor as Secretary of State, Abel Upshur, justified annexation on the broad ground of 
arresting British influence in North America.  Specifically, Upshur saw annexation as a question 
of safety for the South and interest for the North.
13
  Congressional Whigs disagreed after 
spending most of Tyler‟s term grappling with “His Accidency‟s” apostasy.  Specifically, Tyler 
had vetoed Whig economic legislation such as internal improvements and re-chartering a 
national bank.  When the treaty of annexation came before the Senate in April 1844 the majority 
Whigs moved to defeat it, but not before reading a disastrous document Calhoun had sent with 
the treaty.  In a letter to the British minister Robert Pakenham, Calhoun defended annexation as 
pro-slavery policy.  Failure to annex Texas would permit Britain “the most efficient means of 
effecting in the neighboring States of this Union what she avows to be her desire to do in all 
countries where slavery exists.”14  Calhoun instantly sectionalized the issue, hardened Whig 
opposition, and split Northern Democrats.  On June 8th, the treaty failed 35-16: Whigs voted no 
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27-1, Southern Democrats voted yes 10-1, and Northern Democrats split 7-5 against with one 
abstention.
15
  By framing annexation in pro-slavery terms, Calhoun seemed to harm his cause. 
However, if Calhoun intended to rouse Southerners to defend their property rights in 
human flesh, then his letter was successful.  Even his old enemy concurred with him on annexing 
Texas, to secure both the nation and the South from British malevolence.  Printed in the 
Washington Globe, and reprinted elsewhere, former President Andrew Jackson‟s May 1844 letter 
identified Texas as “the key to our safety” and stated annexation would “lock the door against 
future danger.”16  Much to Calhoun‟s dismay and Jackson‟s fury, Southern Whigs chose party 
unity instead of slavery‟s security.  Writing more explicitly in July, Jackson claimed that failing 
to annex Texas would invite “British influence and under the pretense of abolishing slavery will 
be interfering with our rights, and it will never cease.”17  One South Carolina paper distilled 
Jackson‟s rage further: annexation was “a question concerning our security- our very existence 
itself.”18  Yet, grandstanding about slavery‟s security pushed a losing issue as already 
demonstrated in Congress.  The bisectional party system remained strong enough to render a 
sectionalist appeal useless and Southern Whigs had little to gain from adding more slave states.  
Only a historical accident had obstructed the Whig economic program, Tyler‟s ascension after 
William Harrison‟s unexpected death.  Furthermore, Southern Democrats were a minority within 
their party, and Northern Democrats had voted against pro-slavery annexation.  Expansion 
required a national character and justification to attain a Congressional majority.  
Northerners had little to gain by annexing Texas.  Northerners would not move into a 
territory where they had to compete with slave labor and planters monopolized the best land.  
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The South‟s prospective gain in political power from admitting another slave state made the 
Pakenham Letter even more infuriating.  Northerners excoriated Calhoun‟s letter as “collateral, 
irrelevant to the issue, and calculated to affect the question injuriously.”19  Yet the pending 
election put Northern Democrats in a dilemma.  Repudiating annexation so popular among 
Southern Democrats would divide the party and probably assure victory for Henry Clay and the 
Whigs, but embracing annexation on pro-slavery grounds hurt their own re-election prospects.  
These constraints led pro-annexation Northerners to make contorted national security arguments.  
Lewis Cass, Michigan Democrat and a presidential hopeful, wrote a letter in The Globe, 
reprinted elsewhere, which exemplified Northern Democrats‟ dilemma.  Cass favored 
“immediate annexation” because Texas was ideal ground for “the occupation of English black 
troops, and for letting them loose on our Southern States.”20  Cass, by arguing for expansion 
from national security grounds without explicitly endorsing slavery, stoked slave owner‟s 
deepest fear, slave insurrection.  Cass correctly invoked British designs on Texas as a national 
security threat but he could not circumvent the slavery issue, and he further inflamed Southern 
Democrats‟ pro-slavery expansionist views by trying to skirt it.  The Texas issue loomed so large 
that the Democracy nearly fractured at its late May 1844 convention.  Leading candidate Martin 
Van Buren supported annexation only by negotiation: he did not desire a conflict with Mexico.
21
  
Southerners disagreed.  The convention‟s two-thirds majority rule allowed the South to block 
Van Buren‟s nomination, and he fell short of the threshold for eight ballots before withdrawing.  
Cass benefited from Van Buren‟s fall but not enough to secure the supermajority either as Van 
Buren‟s men united against him.  In the search for a nominee acceptable to all, Tennessee‟s 
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James Polk was put forth as a compromise choice and nominated on the ninth ballot.  With a 
dark horse nominee, Democratic sentiment for annexation started crystallizing.
22
  
The political posturing caught The United States Democratic Review and Magazine‟s 
attention.  As a national and pro-expansionist journal, the Democratic Review would be the 
principal national voice for Young America.  Its approach was the hallmark strategy of young 
Democrats: it took up the annexation issue in the context of finding a lowest common 
denominator to build party consensus for annexation.  In response to sectional angst, the 
Democratic Review went on the offensive in April 1844 by attacking southern sectionalism for 
its irrelevance and abolitionists for their hysteria about additional slave states.  The journal 
condemned the politicization of a “local issue”, slavery, to create discord as unproductive and 
possibly dangerous.  Additionally, abolitionists failed to comprehend that free state control of the 
federal government might “dissolve the Union”, but it “would not dissolve the bonds of slavery 
within the Slave States.”23  To keep this immaterial issue from inhibiting party unity, and build 
consensus, the Democratic Review reinvented Jefferson‟s “empire of liberty” claim as an 
argument: land as synonymous with freedom is egalitarian.  Who could oppose land acquisition 
which extended the Union‟s blessings?  Of strategic importance, the Democratic Review failed to 
specify what blessings it meant.  Instead, it broadly pronounced “Our system of 
government…will bear indefinite extension; nor do we doubt that in the fullness of time it is 
destined to embrace… every habitable square inch of this continent.”24  Whigs‟ obstruction 
delayed the inevitable and anti-annexation Northern Democrats would be replaced.  Texas was 
just the beginning. 
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Pro-annexationists quickly seized on the Democratic Review‟s providential and 
continental language.  The New York Herald favored annexation “at all risks and hazards” as did 
“the bulk of this community” which also favored annexing the whole continent “not yet 
embraced within the arms of the Union.”  The idea of acquiring “the mines of Mexico” 
exemplified the blend of national interest and inevitability continental language created.
25
  
Territorial aggrandizement offered benefits for all; land for commoners, silver for the economy, 
and political representation for each section.   In the South, pro-annexationists melded anti-
British rhetoric and pro-Democratic sentiment.  One Mississippi paper disparaged British interest 
in Texas as “perfectly immaterial” because Americans, intent on having Texas, would act 
through the “ruling party of the Union”, the Democracy.26  Southern faith in the Democracy 
rested on the Democratic Party Platform‟s call for the “re-annexation of Texas” at the “earliest 
practicable period.”27  The campaign helped smooth the angst of the spring as both sections 
worked hard to elect Polk.  Southern Democrats, such as Mississippi‟s Robert Walker, implored 
their fellow Southerners to vote against the anti-annexationist Clay.
28
  Northern Democrats did 
their duty by delivering Van Buren‟s New York, and its victory clinching thirty-six electoral 
votes.  Yet, Polk‟s slim plurality in the popular vote, 49.5 percent to Clay‟s 48.1 percent, 
indicated a public divided over annexation.
29
 
In December, when the 28
th
 Congress reconvened for its lame-duck session, Tyler 
intended to force the annexation issue.  In his final annual message to Congress he claimed that 
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“a controlling majority of the people and a large majority of the States have declared in favor of 
immediate annexation.”30  Cognizant that he could not muster the two-thirds majority in the 
Senate, Tyler decided on annexation by a joint-resolution, requiring simple majorities, despite 
Northern Whigs‟ objections of unconstitutionality.  Southern Whigs then made matters worse.  
Eyeing heavy Whig losses in the Deep South from the recent election, Tennessee‟s Milton 
Brown introduced an amendment permitting Texas to divide itself into five states.  Whiggery 
could now claim credit for annexing Texas and deny political rewards to the Democrats.  
Northern Whigs refused to cooperate.  Indiana‟s Caleb Smith repeated an old Whig adage: “Our 
territory is already sufficiently extensive to promote the welfare of all.”31  Aside from principle, 
Tyler had vetoed Whig legislation so Whigs should respond by blocking annexation. 
With the slavery issue looming, the Democratic Review issued another epistle.  It 
attacked Calhoun by calling the pro-slavery grounds for annexation “a great wrong” done to the 
North.  Selfish sectional reasons corrupted normal partisan framework, yet a higher good existed.  
The Democratic Review stated as “much as the North is entitled to complain of the false position 
into which it has been thrown- great as is the sacrifice of feeling and pride to be made to the 
patriotism and larger view of national policy, in yielding to the South on this point.”32  Tyler was 
handing Democrats the fulfillment of a campaign promise before Polk even took office, and the 
Democrats acted accordingly.  By a party-line vote, Democrats added Brown‟s amendment to the 
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joint-resolution 118-101 with Northern Democrats voting 50-30 yes.
33
  The House approved the 
joint-resolution as amended 120-98 and sent it to the Senate.
34
   
Pro-annexationists faced formidable obstacles in the Senate.  The Whigs held a 28-24 
majority and Missouri Democrat Thomas Hart Benton, a nationalist from one of the South‟s least 
enslaved states, had voted against the treaty.  All twenty-four Democrats and three Whig 
turncoats would be needed to pass the joint-resolution.  An agreement which allowed the 
president to either continue negotiations with Texas over its boundary or permit its self-division 
mollified Benton.  Each section, confident Polk would annex Texas on their terms, put aside their 
differences.  Across the aisle, the Whigs engaged in an arduous debate on everything from 
circumventing the Constitution to how annexation would weaken upper and border South 
slavery.  When the debate ended the requisite three Whigs, Merrick of Maryland, Johnson of 
Louisiana, and Henderson of Mississippi joined a unanimous Democracy.  Annexation passed 
27-25.
35
  The House quickly passed the Senate version and Tyler signed the bill. 
Nationalism and its Prophets: Manifest Destiny and its Young American Architects 
John L. O‟Sullivan, editor of the Democratic Review and its chief political polemicist, 
watched the Texas drama unfold with great interest.  His expansionist views were known, but his 
preferred mechanism for expansion remained unclear.  His July 1845 article titled “Annexation” 
clarified his position.  It was the “manifest destiny” of the United States to “overspread the 
continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions.”36  
This inevitability demanded a cessation of the opposition to expansion, first with Texas and next 
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with lands further west.  To deny this destiny meant slandering Providence‟s intent for the 
United States.  He then prophesized:  
there is a great deal of annexation yet to take place, within the life of the present 
generation...Texas has been absorbed into the Union in the inevitable fulfillment of the 
general law which is rolling our population westward; the connection of which with that 
ratio of growth in population…is too evident to leave us in doubt of the manifest design 
of Providence in regard to the occupation of this continent.
37
 
In brief, demography is destiny.  The expanding white population successfully 
recapitulated the democratic system thus enlarging the American Union.  While O‟Sullivan 
borrowed from Jefferson‟s vision of a large decentralized republic, he disregarded Jefferson‟s 
belief that the republic should end at the Rocky Mountains.  Based on the distance between the 
Pacific Coast and the United States, Jefferson reasoned that any settlements along the Pacific 
should become an independent republic even though American settlers would probably populate 
the region.
38
  However, the rapid pace of American expansion towards the Pacific, migration of 
persons and addition of states to the Union, rendered Jefferson‟s vision defunct by outpacing his 
projections.  Within a few decades, as O‟Sullivan noted, Americans had marched towards the 
Pacific and remade much of the frontier in the democratic image central to American identity.  
O‟Sullivan promoted this process because he reasoned that expansion meant increased freedom 
to which no deterrent logically existed.  Arguing against Manifest Destiny meant attacking the 
cultivation of freedom which Americans had lauded for decades; even centuries, if dated to 
Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor John Winthrop‟s 1630 “city upon a hill” sermon.  
O‟Sullivan couched an existing idea of freedom in providential, continental, and nationalistic 
language in effect forging an ideology. 
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By the time “Annexation” appeared, expansionism had gripped politicians.  Specifically, 
young Democrats desired more than Texas.  Many of these Democrats moved west at a young 
age and drew their political beliefs from the political combat and explosive economic growth 
during Andrew Jackson‟s presidency (1829-1837).39  Young Democrats also had support from 
Michigan‟s Lewis Cass and Missouri‟s Thomas Hart Benton on territorial aggrandizement.  
O‟Sullivan, and later George Sanders, served as the editor of young Democrats‟ media organ, the 
Democratic Review.
40
  This bisectional Democratic coterie took the name Young America to 
mark their common age and a new vision for the Democracy and the nation.  Domestically, 
young Democrats embraced free trade and a looser construction of the Constitution.
41
  Domestic 
freedom necessarily implied freedom from government intervention and allegiance to antiquated 
ideas, such as strict-constructionist Jeffersonian agrarianism.  In foreign affairs, they articulated a 
foreign policy of democracy promotion.
42
  As a burgeoning democracy, the United States 
represented the antithesis of decadent monarchical Europe and democracy‟s continental 
expansion served as validation.  Young Democrats were Manifest Destiny‟s architects who 
exhorted the people to embrace their vision of a transcontinental nation and democratic power.  
By working as a vanguard, young Democrats clashed with Whigs over expansion‟s benefits for 
the nation even as they pulled reluctant Jacksonians towards their vision of the nation‟s future. 
“Fifty-Four Forty or Fight!” Manifest Destiny Diplomacy- Expansion Part II, 1845-1846 
With Texas annexed, Young America eyed the jointly occupied, American and British, 
Oregon territory.  Vaster than Texas, the Oregon territory stretched from the border of Russian 
America (present day Alaska) at 54°40′ down to the northern border of California.  The territory 
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encompassed all of present day British Columbia, Oregon, Washington State, and Idaho, as well 
a part of western Montana and Wyoming.  Oregon represented an ideal test case for Manifest 
Destiny‟s paradoxical nature.  Oregon‟s geography muted the expansion of slavery issue that had 
plagued the annexation of Texas, and the presence of a port for building trade with Asia could 
foster bipartisanship.  Most importantly, opposition to Britain‟s presence could enhance Manifest 
Destiny‟s democratic dimensions and unify Americans against their aristocratic nemesis.  Yet, 
the Democratic Party Platform‟s claim that the American title to the “whole territory of Oregon 
is clear and unquestionable” and “no portion of the same ought to be ceded to England” created a 
problem.
43
  How far would nationalists go to attain all of Oregon?  Did the situation warrant an 
aggressive stance?  If O‟Sullivan was right, the influx of American settlers made annexation 
inevitable.  Young Democrats, particularly those from the northwest, did not agree with 
O‟Sullivan‟s pacific vision.  They wanted all of Oregon, and now, much to the consternation of 
Jacksonians, Southern Democrats, and Whigs. 
Northern Democrats had good reason to expect Southern support in their bid for all of 
Oregon: Northerners had swallowed the rejection of Van Buren and helped annex Texas.  
Additionally, Polk set the party-line when he echoed the platform‟s assertion of a “clear and 
unquestionable” title in his inaugural speech.44  But most importantly, all-Oregon Democrats 
could leverage Anglophobia for party unity.  After learning of Polk‟s claim, London‟s Times 
proclaimed “the same democratic folly which makes [Americans] arrogant in the Cabinet makes 
them habitually feeble in all that constitutes a nation‟s strength in the field” [italics added].45  
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The Democratic press, in all sections, erupted into frenzy.  The Mississippian declared “we must 
not part with a foot of soil in Oregon; and if war must come, LET IT COME” [emphasis in the 
original].
46
  The Mississippian later attacked Calhoun‟s organ, The Charleston Mercury, for 
supporting compromise with Britain.  “The northern democracy magnanimously fought with us 
for Texas, and they may be assured that the south will not fail them in maintaining our right to 
the country of Oregon.”47  Calhoun and his disciples would appear hypocritical to abandon 
Oregon after Northerners added Texas for slavery.  Such a display of loyalty and defiance of 
Calhoun by Southern Democrats undoubtedly heartened Northerners seeking all of Oregon. 
Northerners eyed the Oregon territory because it would easily equal and probably surpass 
Texas in size, and be all free territory.  Anglophobia merely provided a convenient reason to 
adopt a hard-line stance.  The New York Herald stated “every inch of Oregon is ours and must be 
preserved.”  Instead of war, the United States could use peaceful coercion by self-embargoing 
cotton exports.  The absence of American cotton would cripple English textile manufacturing, 
thus bringing about “a civil revolution” and a peaceful settlement with a chastened Britain.48  The 
Weekly Ohio Statesman melodramatically declared the Oregon dispute as a contest “between 
democracy and aristocracy.”49  To that point, “Throughout the great west, and we believe 
throughout the Union, the cry of to arms to defend the integrity of our soil” would overwhelm 
those seeking compromise.
50
  But the rhetoric did not obscure the complications which came 
with the territory.  Namely, did the port mean more than the land north of it?  The Democratic 
Review had an answer, albeit a convoluted one.  It maintained the American right to Oregon as 
perfect but viewed a compromise at the 49
th
 parallel as acceptable: “we most want, the noble 
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harbors about the Strait of Fuca [the water which lies between Vancouver Island and the 
Olympic Peninsula and provides the outlet to the Pacific].”  Yet, the Democratic Review also 
claimed a war would produce “the extinction of British power on this continent” before 
backtracking to state that war should not be desired.
51
  Despite the bombast about perfect titles, 
national interest and angst remained potent forces.  Specifically, Congress would be under 
tremendous pressure in its diplomacy with Britain at whom the expansionist press bellowed. 
 Upon convening in December 1845, the 29
th
 Congress immersed itself in the Oregon 
question as Polk‟s first annual message to Congress called for the abrogation of the treaty of 
joint-occupation with Britain.
52
  Polk‟s demand generated controversy because it changed the 
issue from diplomatic bargaining for territory into a dispute about rights to the territory.  
Northern Democrats, specifically Northwestern young Democrats, demanded all of Oregon even 
at the risk of war, which the Whigs decried.  However, Whigs‟ insistence on a peaceful 
settlement only served to embolden the war hawks.  After proposing resolutions calling for an 
inquiry into United States‟ military readiness, Cass pontificated on America‟s claim to Oregon. 
“We must maintain it or abandon it.  A vigorous and enterprising people are fast increasing there, 
who will possess the country by the best title of all- that of occupation and improvement.”  The 
United States could either provide them with a government or the settlers would establish their 
own.  William Allen added that Britain‟s history of gun boat diplomacy necessitated an 
evaluation of the military.  Evaluating readiness did not, as the Whigs repeatedly claimed, 
indicate an inevitable conflict.
53
  The United States, Allen insisted, could not afford to negotiate 
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from weakness with Britain for practical reasons.  Unfortunately for young Democrats, Southern 
Democrats had other ideas about practicality. 
Southern Democrats faced a dilemma.  They owed Northern colleagues for bringing 
Texas into the Union, and Polk‟s tough stance only increased the pressure.  Yet, Southerners 
stood to lose much in a war with Britain with the likelihood of a naval blockade destroying the 
cotton trade and an invasion targeting and possibly destroying slavery.  Accordingly, many 
cotton state Democrats proved tenuous allies and, at times, sided with the Whigs in requesting a 
peaceful settlement.  Southern Democrats supported Manifest Destiny so long as it did not 
imperil the cotton trade with their best customer.  They preferred Calhoun‟s 1843 advice, 
pursuing a course of “wise and masterly inactivity” which mirrored O‟Sullivan‟s vision.  After 
outlining why the United States could not militarily evict Britain from North America, Calhoun 
had stated the American population was “rolling towards the shores of the Pacific."54  Yet, 
Calhoun diverged from O‟Sullivan by claiming that American settlers had not ventured north of 
the 49
th
 parallel.  Where O‟Sullivan would claim that Americans would eventually populate all 
of Oregon, Calhoun and Southern Democrats saw settlement patterns as indicative of a natural 
boundary.  However, young Democrats showed no signs of softening their stance. 
In 1844, O‟Sullivan established The New York Morning News, and in a December 27, 
1845 editorial he declared the American claim to all of Oregon “The True Title.”  He dismissed 
Whigs‟ favorite arguments, historical exploration and international law, as irrelevant.  The 
future, not the past, determined a claim‟s validity: 
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We are free to say that were the respective cases and arguments of the two parties, as to 
all these points of history and law reversed-had England all ours, and we nothing but 
hers- our claim to Oregon would still be best and stronger.  And that claim is by the right 
of our manifest destiny to overspread and possess the whole of the continent which 
Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of liberty and 
federated self-government entrusted to us.
55
  
 As a democracy, the future favored the United States, which O‟Sullivan supported by 
citing the American population boom.  American, not British, settlers had flooded into Oregon in 
recent years, and they would eventually annex Oregon.  This same process brought Texas into 
the Union, and now it had spread across North America: Manifest Destiny in its pure peaceful 
form.  Yet O‟Sullivan was not finished.  Nine days later he gave continental conquest a partisan 
spin by hailing the Democracy as the “true national party, the true American party, the true party 
of sympathy with the genius of our country, the true instrument for achieving the future glories 
and grandeurs of its destiny.”56  Aligning the partisan and the providential created a strong 
unifying rhetorical framework.  By opposing the annexation of all of Oregon, the Whigs had 
futilely sided against destiny while bemoaning a war with Britain that would never happen.  
Democrats, young and old, just needed to remain unified, and the Whig opposition would 
inevitably collapse.  But however strong the theory, it did not override political behavior within 
the Democracy or convince the Whigs of their futility. 
Massachusetts Representative Robert Winthrop gave the Whigs‟ response to young 
Democrats‟ and O‟Sullivan‟s belligerence.  Winthrop spent most of his speech opining about the 
horrors of war, which war hawks seemed to either ignore or not seriously consider.  Near the 
end, he turned to O‟Sullivan and the Democrats‟ new ideology: “I suppose the right of a manifest 
destiny to spread, will not be admitted to exist in any nation except the universal Yankee 
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nation!”57  Whigs refused to recognize nationalism structured around abstractions of a nation 
endlessly recapitulating itself.  Instead, Whigs fell back on their economic program of intensive 
development and insisted the nation should acquire the port and cede the land north of it to 
Britain.  Dividing the territory at the 49
th
 parallel, as suggested by Winthrop and pursued by 
previous administrations, would accomplish that reasonable goal.
58
  Winthrop deplored the 
behavior of young Democrats after Polk terminated negotiations, notably Indiana‟s Edward 
Hannegan whose cries of “no compromise at forty-nine” seemed delusional.59  The right of 
manifest destiny would neither protect the nation from the British military nor satisfactorily 
resolve the Oregon dispute.  Winthrop‟s speech outlined an often used Whig refrain in the 
coming months: if the Democrats opted for war then they would suffer the consequences.  Yet 
Whigs and Southern Democrats seemed oblivious to how young Democrats‟ rhetoric had 
reframed the issue.  The debate did not concern the act of expansion, deemed inevitable, but how 
adding land meshed with American self-understanding.  Specifically, young Democrats saw land 
as the backbone of democracy because land gave one control over one‟s destiny (subsistence 
farming or staple crop production).  However concrete the subject of the debate, land, the 
argument focused on the abstract purpose of any new lands. 
Throughout the winter and into the spring the debate followed a persistent pattern: young 
Democrats from the Northwest demanded all of Oregon, Northeastern Democrats provided some 
support, Southern Democrats split regionally between the cotton and upper South, and the Whigs 
united in resistance.
60
  A House resolution, abrogation notice for the treaty of joint-occupation, 
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passed 163 to 54 on February 9th before moving across the Capitol.
61
  The next day‟s events 
demonstrated the chaotic nature of the Senate debate, particularly within the Democracy.  
Hannegan proposed a resolution calling Oregon “part and parcel” of the United States and stating 
the government could not transfer the allegiance of American settlers to Britain.  Calhoun 
quickly motioned to replace Hannegan‟s resolution with one affirming the president‟s right to 
negotiate the boundary with the Senate‟s advice and consent.  Calhoun‟s duplicity represented a 
problem for young Democrats seeking all of Oregon, the unreliability of Southern Democrats.  
Under Calhoun‟s direction, Southern Democrats had leveraged Anglophobia against Northerners 
in pursuit of Texas but now they deserted the expansionist project they had precipitated.  Allen 
responded to Calhoun by ranting about European desires to cripple the United States thereby 
extinguishing the fire of liberty in favor of the monarchical tyranny.  Next, he denounced Britain 
for seeking to block American prosperity since 1783 by interfering with American commerce 
and for its “interposition of fictitious, frivolous, and vexatious claims” to North American 
territory.
62
  This bombastic performance, that opened the Senate debate, seemed indicative of the 
struggle which lay ahead.  Polk‟s demand for Congress to pass an abrogation notice had 
catalyzed uproar not unity.  This proved especially true within the Democracy which fought 
itself more than the Whigs, with young Democrats playing a central role.    
A party split seemed imminent after an incendiary March 5th exchange between the pro-
compromise Senator Haywood (North Carolina Democrat) and the war hawks.  Haywood 
claimed Polk‟s actions relating to Oregon were “pacific” and the president would avoid going to 
war.  Hannegan inquired if Haywood spoke for Polk, and when Haywood tried to evade the 
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question Allen interjected that he would construe Haywood‟s answer “into a negative.”  The 
debate quickly degenerated.  
Haywood: I deny the right of any Senators to put questions to me in this way.  I have not 
assumed to speak by authority of the President. 
Allen: Then the Senator takes back his speech. 
Haywood:  Not all; but I am glad to see that my speech takes. 
Allen: With the British. 
Allen did the unthinkable: accuse a fellow Democrat of pro-British sympathies!  Such a 
charge, usually reserved for the Whigs, amounted to an accusation of treason.  Before the shock 
of Allen‟s rhetorical bomb could subside, Hannegan gained the floor for a vitriolic speech.  
Whether or not Haywood answered his question about speaking for Polk was “entirely 
immaterial” because the relevant question centered on the boundary.  Hannegan demanded all of 
Oregon, and he believed Polk supported this position: a claim he supported by quoting an April 
1844 speech Polk gave in such he affirmed an all Oregon stance.  Hannegan then raged at Polk, 
whom history would condemn as a sellout if he compromised.   
So long as one human eye remains to linger on the page of history, the story of his 
abasement will be read, sending him and his name together to an infamy so profound, a 
damnation so deep, that the hand of resurrection will never be able to drag him forth.  He 
who is a traitor to his country, can never have forgiveness of God, and cannot ask mercy 
of man.  
Despite Senator Mangum (North Carolina Whig) calling Hannegan to order, the diatribe reached 
a stirring climax.  If Polk intended to compromise then “James K Polk has spoken words of 
falsehood, and with the tongue of a serpent.”63  Before Allen could continue, the Senate 
adjourned with the Democratic breach exposed.  Southerners had refused to support Westerners‟ 
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belligerence, and Young America hawks responded by trying to browbeat party moderates and 
Polk into line with their vision.  Rather than galvanize the party, Oregon was tearing it apart. 
The angry debate continued into the spring, with an occasional sectional outburst.  
Notably, Illinois‟ Sydney Breese clashed with South Carolina‟s George McDuffie in early April.  
McDuffie wished to avoid war with Britain, and he asserted the land north of the 49
th
 parallel 
had little agricultural use, which Breese rebuffed but to no avail.
64
  The temporary alliance of 
Southern Democrats and a united Whig Party made young Democrats‟ intransigence irrelevant.  
Northerners could cry betrayal and reference Southern Democrats willingness to fight Britain for 
Texas, but it did not change any minds.  Southern Democrats would not fight a war with their 
primary cotton customer.  On April 16
th
, the Senate passed a conciliatory abrogation notice, 
written by Kentucky Whig John Crittenden, leaving the door open for negotiations with Britain.  
The Senate further rebuked Young America by denying Allen, Chairman of the Foreign 
Relations Committee, a place on the conference committee to reconcile the House and Senate 
versions.
65
  The resolution passed on April 23rd with overwhelming majorities, 42-10 in the 
Senate and 142-46 in the House.  Allen and Hanneagan‟s behavior had been repudiated and the 
paradox of Manifest Destiny affirmed.  In the Senate, all twenty-four Whigs and eighteen 
Democrats voted against ten dissenting Democrats primarily from the Northwest.
66
  Manifest 
Destiny proved incapable of galvanizing popular support or presenting a united front of 
Democratic, let alone Congressional, support for Polk in his diplomacy with Britain.  It allowed 
and encouraged the opposite to occur. 
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Chapter 2:  Climax.   
“For the stars of Heaven and the constellations thereof shall not give their light: the sun shall be darkened 
in his going forth, and the moon shall not cause her light to shine.” Isaiah 13:10 
From Oregon, destiny‟s arrow turned south towards Mexico, which held the last 
conquerable vestige of North America in foreign hands still.  Completed by force, Manifest 
Destiny during the Mexican War inverted party paradigms.  Negative government Democrats 
defended positive force and Polk‟s strong leadership despite virulent Whig condemnations.  
Their hunger for western land, particularly California, made them strong defenders of the war.  
Young Democrats‟ support for the war also proved essential to halting the proposed ban on 
slavery in any new territories, the Wilmot Proviso, which had its roots in Northern grievances 
about how the annexation of Texas and Oregon had transpired.  However, the paradox of 
Manifest Destiny prompted such sectional animosities that it necessitated monumental efforts on 
the part of young Democrats to quell, at least for the moment, the sectional outbreak. 
To the Halls of Montezuma: the Travails of War- Expansion Part III, 1846-1848  
 Shortly after passing the abrogation notice, tensions between the United States and 
Mexico exploded.  Relations had been poor recently: Mexico refused to recognize the United 
States‟ annexation of Texas, broke diplomatic relations, and rebuffed Polk‟s offers to buy 
California.  In January 1846, Polk moved soldiers under General Zachary Taylor into Mexican 
territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande.  In early May, reports of shooting 
between Mexican and American forces in the territory arrived in Washington and led Polk to 





soil.”67  Young Democrats happily complied with Polk‟s demand for a declaration of war by 
using heavy-handed parliamentary tactics.  On May 11th, House Democrats gagged debate and 
spent most of the allotted two hours reading the war message and accompanying documents.  
More importantly, Ohio Democrat Jacob Brinkerhoff added a preamble to a supply bill stating 
“by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between the United States and that 
Republic.”68  Whigs now faced the dilemma of voting for Polk‟s claims about the conflict‟s 
origins or voting against supporting the troops.  Using a point of personal privilege to gain the 
floor, Kentucky Whig Garrett Davis lambasted the preamble as “so bold a falsehood” given the 
“war was begun by the President.”  Stephen Douglas rebuffed Davis by calling him to order for 
criticizing the preamble instead of explaining why he should be excused from voting.  Davis‟ 
diatribe promptly ended and the House voted overwhelmingly for war, 174-14 with 35 
abstentions.  Many Whigs, including Davis, voted for war rather than appear unpatriotic.
69
 
 With no time limit on debate, Calhoun led the Senate opposition against the House 
resolution the next day.  Calhoun wanted the preamble excised because no evidence confirming a 
state of war between the two republics existed.  Only the Mexican government had legitimate 
war making power and it could easily disavow the border incident as the irresponsibility of 
individuals.  Unmoved by Calhoun‟s emphasis on technicalities, Allen retorted that the 
opposition “could not close their eyes” to the fact that a state of war existed after hearing Polk‟s 
message.
70
  Cass concurred by noting that whether or not the Mexican government had declared 
war was irrelevant.  The deaths of Americans consecrated the continued Mexican threats of 
retaliation ever since the United States had annexed Texas.  Contrary to Calhoun‟s legalism, 
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Cass claimed Congress best recognize the state of war which already existed.
71
  After multiple 
parliamentary maneuvers to strike the preamble failed, the Senate voted 40-2 with three 
abstentions to declare war; all Democrats voted yes, two Whigs voted no and two Whigs along 
with Calhoun abstained.
72
  By force, Manifest Destiny would complete continental conquest with 
the Democratic Party seemingly united. 
 The reactions in the press by the apostles of Manifest Destiny seemed to indicate the 
expansionist character of this war.  The Indiana Sentinel manifested its feelings with the headline 
“War at Last.”  Even the pacifist O‟Sullivan who initially opposed war with Mexico changed his 
mind.  He had long asserted the burgeoning American settlements in California would eventually 
overwhelm the sparse Mexican populations and bring California into the Union.  The war offered 
the chance to expedite the acquisition process, and O‟Sullivan declared, “We therefore insist 
upon the immediate acquisition of California.”73  Expansionists justified obtaining Mexican 
territory as compensation for an indemnity Mexico owed to the United States.  Specifically, 
American citizens claimed anywhere from two to ten million dollars in damages from Mexican 
injuries, particularly with regard to shipping disruptions and attacks on American citizens.
74
  The 
routine government changes and general chaos in Mexico had left it bankrupt, which suited 
Polk‟s purposes.  Mexico could not afford to prosecute the war for long, and land would prove 
suitable compensation after the war ended.  
 In early August 1846 Polk confirmed the war‟s expansionist character when he asked 
Congress to appropriate two million dollars to pay Mexico “for any cession of territory.”  With 
the Congressional session nearing its end, Polk surmised the lack of time would force a vote with 
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little or no debate and give him a quick victory.  Instead, Pennsylvania‟s David Wilmot rose to 
vent Northern Democrats‟ frustrations with Polk.  Northern Democrats had loyally supported a 
president who seemed determined to add slave territory, a frustrating predicament for Northern 
Democrats who Northern Whigs often accused of subservience to slaveholders.  If this war did 
not concern the extension of slave territory, then Polk could prove it by supporting an amended 
appropriations bill soon dubbed the Wilmot Proviso: “that, as an express and fundamental 
condition to the acquisition of any territory from the Republic of Mexico…neither slavery nor 
involuntary servitude shall ever exist in any part of said territory.”  On a sectional vote, the 
appropriations bill as amended passed the House 85 to 79 with all Southerners opposed.  
Doomed by the Senate‟s sectional equilibrium, the session expired before a vote could be 
taken.
75
  The proviso and the sectional vote in the House revealed the more problematic side of 
the war and Manifest Destiny.  The lack of a definitive judgment on slavery‟s role in continental 
expansion had left the door open for a calamity.  What was slavery‟s role in a supposedly 
expanding free democratic society?  Did it have a role at all?  In the short term, such questions 
seemed immaterial because the proviso assumed there would be territorial acquisition.  However, 
slavery became useful as political leverage between politicians laying claim to the spoils of a 
victory not yet achieved.  This leverage would have been unnecessary if Manifest Destiny could 
marginalize, if not overcome, sectional differences instead of veiling them (or intraparty 
squabbles for that matter). 
 The proviso originated with Van Buren Democrats, Northeasterners mostly from New 
York, who were fed up with Polk and Southern Democrats.  These Northeastern Democrats 
represented the party‟s older wing which viewed economics as the major division between the 
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parties although they supported expansion under the right conditions.  However, the recent 
expansionist projects had seemingly maximized Southern gain and left Northerners with broken 
promises.  Southern Democrats made the annexation of Texas an issue of party loyalty, and 
Northern Democrats eventually gave their support.  Southern Democrats then demanded the 
Brown Amendment with its permission for Texas‟ self-division into five states, a prospective 
boost in Southern political power immediately jumped from two senators to possibly ten.
76
  Van 
Burenites swallowed their frustrations and supported annexation, hoping Polk would renegotiate 
Texas‟ territory without the Brown Amendment per the deal negotiated with Benton.  They 
forgot Tyler was still president and he, possibly at Calhoun‟s urging, dispatched a courier with 
orders permitting Texas‟ admission with the Brown Amendment intact.  Van Burenites howled 
with protest, yet Polk refused to countermand Tyler‟s orders.  Then Polk agreed to partition 
Oregon after initially taking a hard-line position, and his treaty passed because Southern 
Democrats sided with the Whigs.  Now, Polk‟s war threatened to increase Southern political 
power by adding more slave states.  Van Buren had warned Northern Democrats that supporting 
an aggressive war for adding slave territory would be “political suicide.”  Northern Democrats 
needed time, and the proviso could at least delay a final decision on territorial acquisition or help 
gain free territory out of what seemed a slave owner‟s war.77  However, the rebels received 
inconsistent support from their Northwestern brethren. 
   Northwestern Democrats were not Van Burenites: they embraced expansion and 
championed Manifest Destiny.  Polk‟s compromise on Oregon, dividing it at the 49th parallel, 
surely infuriated them just as Polk‟s Texas betrayal enraged Van Burenites.  Northwestern House 
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Democrats‟ initial support for the Wilmot Proviso says as much about their desire for political 
retribution.
78
  Northwestern Senators shared their House colleagues‟ anger over Oregon but their 
ire came to naught.  When Polk submitted the treaty for ratification, all twenty-four Whigs and 
seventeen Democrats (fifteen of them Southerners) voted yes.  Of the fourteen dissenting votes, 
twelve came from the North and two from the South with Young Americans Allen, Breese, 
Bright, Cass, and Hannegan registering five dissenting votes.
79
  Yet, the anger proved short-lived 
as young Democrats supported the war and voted down the proviso.  Specifically, the war 
pushed the key Young American goal of completing continental conquest.  Allen moved from 
demanding all of Oregon to lusting after California, identifying it as “only nominally a part of 
Mexico.”80  Young American Senators, unlike their House colleagues, seemed to comprehend 
Manifest Destiny‟s broader implications: California could compensate for the Oregon setback.  
Manifest Destiny entailed expanding into space with only the Pacific Ocean as a definitive 
boundary, and slavery need not contaminate discussions of expansion.  However, previous 
instances and the chaos in the House indicated that Southern allies could not so easily be brought 
to heel.  A resurgent opposition only added to young Democrats‟ plethora of problems. 
 By harnessing antiwar sentiment, the Whigs won control of the House for the 30
th
 
Congress set to convene in December 1847.  Frustrated by Democrats‟ recent electoral 
misfortune and tiring of the Whigs‟ hypocritical opposition, attacking the war yet voting for 
supply bills, Polk lashed out at his Whig critics with the treason charge.  In his annual message to 
Congress, Polk claimed Whig denunciations of the war encouraged the Mexicans to keep 
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fighting, thus Whigs had “given them „aid and comfort.‟”81  The Whigs responded by viciously 
turning Polk‟s rhetoric back on him.  On December 9th, Davis mocked Polk for usurping the 
Constitution in his war of aggression by establishing temporary governments in the conquered 
provinces.  Leaping to Polk‟s defense, Douglas clashed with Davis over the president‟s power as 
Commander-in-Chief to establish governments in conquered Mexican lands given the war‟s 
questionable legality.
82
  A week later, the abolitionist Whig Joshua Giddings of Ohio lent his 
talent for incendiary commentary.  He condemned the “executive war” begun for expanding 
slavery and then ridiculed Polk‟s defensive message.  According to Giddings, an uninformed 
reader might think the president faced impeachment based on the lengths he [Polk] went to 
defend himself, the war‟s origins, and the war‟s conduct.83  Hearing enough from the Whigs, 
Democrats responded with their own inflammatory rhetoric.  Indiana Democrat Andrew 
Kennedy responded to Giddings the next day, December 16
th
, with a common Democratic 
refrain: the Whigs should stop assailing a war they voted for and continued to support with 
supplies.  Possibly venting party frustrations, Kennedy added a personal barb: “you peace-
loving, war-hating, religious men have a great regard for Mexican blood.”84  Not only were the 
Whigs hypocrites and bordering on treasonous, they were bad Christians.  The charges of treason 
and bad faith helped the parties avoid a sectional outbreak by not discussing the problem of who 
benefited from territorial extension.  Indeed, it proved an odd paradox: the Democrats prosecuted 
a war for territorial extension but refused to address the issue.  They constantly referred to 
Mexican aggressions and injuries which allowed the Whigs to counter that Polk instigated the 
conflict to dismember Mexico.  The arguments appeared partisan as one party defended Polk and 
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the war, while the other denounced both.  Yet the war remained partisan neutral insofar as both 
parties voted the funds that helped Polk prosecute it despite both parties hurling inflammatory 
accusations at each other.  Neither party desired to face the sectionalist consequences of 
discussing territorial aggrandizement. 
House Van Burenites refused to concede on the Wilmot Proviso.  On January 4, 1847 
New York Democrat Preston King, a top Van Burenite, reintroduced the proviso to a three 
million dollar appropriations bill.
85
  The Whigs‟ midterm success made the revolt‟s possible 
consequences devastating: Polk needed money appropriated before the Congress expired on 
March 3rd.  The South Carolina contingent attacked this affront to the South with Constitutional 
legalism.  Another pro-slavery ultra, Robert Barnwell Rhett, asserted the sovereign states jointly 
owned the territories and had not granted Congress any power over slavery in the territories.  
Barring slavery from the territories would amount to amending the Constitution because of the 
implications for representation: excluding slaves who counted as three-fifths of a person for 
Congressional apportionment of seats in the House.  Rhett curiously failed to mention that 
positive legislation would be needed to re-enslave Mexican territory, which had been free since 
September 1829.
86
  Moreover, this legalism was at odds with pragmatism.
  
Two amendments to 
strike the proviso and permit slavery south of 36-30, including one proposed by Douglas, failed 
on February 15th.  Southerners would not concede the exclusion of slavery from territories they 
jointly owned.  After more parliamentary maneuvers to excise the proviso failed, the House 
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In mid-February, Calhoun moved from quietly directing Southerners anti-proviso efforts 
in the House to open opposition.  Long opposed to the war, he joined the Whigs in flaying Polk.  
The “immediate cause of the war” had been Polk‟s decision to deliberately order American 
forces into Mexican territory.
88
  Benton, Young America‟s nationalist ally, saw that Calhoun had 
exposed himself and he gleefully seized the opportunity a few days later.  No one should doubt 
Calhoun‟s knowledge of the war‟s causes because he [Calhoun] was, according to Benton, “the 
author of those causes, and therefore the author of the war.”  In a review of Calhoun‟s long 
political career, Benton highlighted two episodes.  As James Monroe‟s Secretary of War, 
Calhoun supported swapping Florida for the area which later became Texas in the 1819 Adams- 
Onís Treaty.  When Southerners later excoriated Adams for giving away Texas, Calhoun never 
summoned the courage to admit his support for the treaty.  Instead, he used his position as 
Secretary of State in 1845 to pursue a reckless course to recover Texas despite Mexico‟s 
warnings that annexation would mean war.  Worse still, Calhoun urged newspapers on the State 
Department payroll to attack those who desired peaceful annexation and simultaneous settlement 
of the boundary with Mexico as treasonous, according to a State Department document from 
April 11, 1844 which Benton cited.  When Calhoun protested that he did not write such a 
document, Benton mocked Calhoun for assigning Polk the blame for a war which his 
[Calhoun‟s] actions “contracted.”89  However, young Democrats‟ rhetorical victory seemed 
hollow because embarrassing Calhoun did not unite the party.  Instead, Benton‟s polemic could 
spur animosity from Southern Democrats already angry about the Wilmot Proviso. 
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The incendiary speeches left little time to finish legislative business.  The Senate voted 
on the three million dollar bill and rejected the House version with the proviso on March 1st 21-
31: Northerners broke 20-5 for the House bill and Southerners voted 26-1 against.  Young 
America cast crucial negative votes; Benton, Bright, Breese, Cass, and Hannegan.
90
  Shorn of the 
proviso and facing the session‟s end, the House approved the un-amended appropriations bill 
115-81.
91
  Manifest Destiny won its victory over the Whigs‟ seeking “no territory by conquest” 
and insisting the port of San Francisco would suffice for absolving the Mexican indemnity.
92
  
However, it seemed a pyrrhic victory.  Sectional angst had reached the highest levels since 1820 
over territory only present in abstract form since no annexation had yet occurred.  The parties 
cohered not by following Manifest Destiny‟s script, with a destined winner and loser of the 
argument.  Instead, they played on the logic of war: the opposition denounced Polk and the 
Democrats accused the Whigs of treason.  Expansion itself remained too contentious an issue. 
 The Mexican War inverted a Second Party System paradigm concerning government 
power.  Traditionally, the Whigs and Democrats differed over the means of improving the 
Union.  Whigs desired qualitative improvement directed by the federal government in an orderly 
if lengthy process.  The Democrats sought rapid movement into unsettled western spaces to 
recapitulate the Union as it existed.
93
   Now, negative government Democrats supported a war 
which added territory and Pacific ports to foster free trade with Asia.  It had all the markings of 
Whig economics, gaining a port for economic development, but with the Democratic twist of 
free trade.  Whigs, proponents of a strong centralized federal government, denounced the war as 
a flagrant abuse of government power because it quantitatively added to the Union without 
                                                          
90




 Session (1 March 1847) 555. 
91
 Ibid., 3 March 1847, 573. 
92
 Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission, 153.  
93
 Major Wilson, Space, Time, and Freedom: the Quest for Nationality and the Irrepressible Conflict 1815-1861. 





qualitatively improving it.  Pro-free trade young Democrats consequently ridiculed the Whigs for 
decrying the war which acquired the port of San Francisco that they publicly desired.
94
  
Moreover, Whigs wanted to increase industry but had the wrong approach given that growing 
industries need new markets which Whig tariffs would undercut by having industries sell in 
tampered economic conditions.  Democrats repeatedly taunted the Whigs that they could not 
have it all ways, abhorring the war and wanting the port for their flawed economic program. 
The inversion of the government power paradigm unleashed new tensions related to 
slavery.  In response to the Wilmot Proviso, Southerners denied not just federal power over 
slavery where it existed, in the states, but where it might go, the territories.  Mexico‟s abolition 
of slavery gave the inversion added complexity: re-enslaving free territory required either 
formally overturning the prohibition or allowing slave owners into the Mexican Cession in order 
to carve out slave states.  Either way, a confrontation focused on Congress‟ power over slavery 
seemed unavoidable.  Would the nation‟s most anti-democratic institution be allowed into free 
lands won for the regeneration of democracy?  If Congress could enslave free land, could it not 
free enslaved land?  Such questions had no easy answers.  As an ideology, Manifest Destiny 
constituted a world view, not a legal summation of Constitutional power or lack thereof.  The 
war forced each section to reevaluate old principles with the onset of new realities. 
“There Never was an Election of Greater Importance”951848 
 By the onset of the electoral season, the Democracy was tearing itself apart.  The 
Congressional clash over the Wilmot Proviso did not end, but trickled into state politics.  In New 
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York (with its 36 electoral votes), the state Democratic Party split between those who supported 
including the proviso in the state party platform (Van Burenites also known as Barnburners) and 
those who supported the Polk Administration (Hunkers).  Southerners added to the headaches 
with Calhoun, among others, insisting Congress could not exclude slavery from the territories 
jointly owned by the sovereign states.  Yet, that stance did not satisfy a more radical Southern 
sect.  The Alabama state legislature instructed its delegates only to vote for a prospective 
nominee who supported federal protection for slavery in the territories.
96
  However, organizing 
the territories would not be simple: Congress had constitutionally-acknowledged jurisdiction 
which in part provoked the proviso and the subsequent sectionalism.
97
  If left unresolved, the 
raging sectionalism might cost the Democratic Party the election and inflict lasting damage.  
 The problems began as soon as the national convention opened in Baltimore on May 
22nd.  The Barnburners agreed to drop their demand for the Wilmot Proviso if the convention 
seated them and not the Hunkers as the delegates of New York.  The convention did not concur 
and it split both groups in half in order to form a whole delegation, a solution which satisfied 
neither faction.  Then the pro-expansionist Cass, with solid support from the Northwest and the 
South, won a majority on the first ballot and the nomination on the fourth.  Irate at the 
nomination of the man who gained at Van Buren‟s expense in 1844, the Barnburners left.  The 
platform passed smoothly and it contained the customary assertion about the limited powers of 
the federal government.  However, the usual dogma did not suffice for the author of the Alabama 
Platform, William Yancey.  He insisted the federal government had a duty to protect slavery in 
the new territories, a fundamentally positive idea, and he moved to amend the platform 
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accordingly.  When his amendment overwhelmingly failed 216 to 36, Yancey and his followers 
exited.
98
   With the nomination of their ally and the passage of a favorable platform, Young 
America emerged the convention‟s winner.  Additionally, the platform commended Polk for 
reducing the tariff, congratulated France for seeking democratic government, and justified the 
Mexican War.
99
    This was now young Democrats‟ election, and possibly their party. 
 The Whigs had their own divisions as their convention convened in early June in 
Philadelphia.  The repeated failure of their economic program, internal improvements and tariffs, 
to sway the electorate seemingly disqualified leading Whigs such as Webster and Clay (a three-
time loser).  However, this proved a point of contention given that Clay still had support and 
those Whigs championing the selection of a war hero had picked one who held an almost 
antiparty stance.  Zachary Taylor, hero of the Mexican War which the Whigs deplored, refused 
to endorse any traditional Whig positions which the party founder, Clay, embodied.  The first 
ballot indicated sharp division, Taylor at 111 and Clay at 97.   However, the rapid erosion of 
Clay‟s support gave Taylor the nomination on the fourth ballot.  In accordance with Taylor‟s 
anti-party stance, the Whigs did not issue an official platform nor did their “statement of 
principles” address old issues.  Instead, the document dwelled on Taylor‟s leadership ability and 
character.
100
  Possibly out of exasperation, one of Taylor‟s opponents derisively labeled him 
“anything but a Whig.”101  The parties were showing the strain of the shift from old economic 
issues with demarcated differences to the hazy aftermath of territorial expansion.  
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When the Barnburners left Baltimore, Democrats predicted a short lived rebellion.  
Instead, the Barnburners started their own party along with anti-slavery Whigs, mainly from 
Massachusetts, dissatisfied with the nomination of the slaveholder Taylor.  The early August 
convention convened in Buffalo, New York, roughly half-way between the anti-slavery hotbeds 
of Northeastern Ohio and Massachusetts.  On the first ballot, and with some Whig reservations, 
the convention nominated Van Buren for president.
102
  As its signature issue, and to attract a 
broad base of support, the convention adopted the Wilmot Proviso as its platform.  Specifically, 
the platform called for an “act of Congress” to bar slavery from territories organized out of the 
Mexican Cession, and affirmed that Congress could not end slavery in the states where it already 
existed.  Despite affirming an established political reality, these renegades broke with over 
twenty years of precedent.  Rather than avoid discussing slavery, as the Democrats and Whigs 
had done in the past and would do again, the Barnburners sought to attract those disenchanted 
with both parties by forcing a debate.  Ironically, the man most responsible for creating a 
political system devoted to keeping slavery out of politics [Van Buren] now headed the ticket of 
a party committed to discussing slavery.  With their rousing slogan of “Free Soil, Free Speech, 
Free Labor, and Free Men” the nascent Free Soil Party hit the campaign trail.103 
In his December 1847 “Nicholson Letter” Cass articulated Democrats‟ negative 
government solution to the festering sectionalism surrounding the territories issue: allow 
territorial legislatures to decide slavery‟s fate.  Passing the issue to territorial legislatures 
prevented the debates on Congressional power over slavery which spurred so much sectionalist 
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  Young Democrats liked the idea and actively campaigned across the country, with 
Douglas taking a prominent role and even campaigning in the South.
105
  But popular sovereignty, 
like Manifest Destiny, meant different things in each section.  In the South, popular sovereignty 
promised Congress would not impose the hated Wilmot Proviso.  In the North, popular 
sovereignty seemed to guarantee slavery‟s exclusion from the territories based on climate 
inhospitable to cotton cultivation and a growing Northern population seeking Western lands.  In 
a national sense, Manifest Destiny spawned popular sovereignty by reframing slavery‟s 
expansion as a political problem and not a moral question.  Much effort had been spent 
extending the democratic dominion across North America, so local democratic institutions 
should be allowed to settle the slavery issue.  Manifest Destiny encompassed all Americans who 
prided themselves on living under democratic government.  Allow territorial residents to render 
the decision and consider it final upon application for statehood. 
Attacking the other side has a prominent role in any campaign, but it had a different twist 
in 1848.  The Democrats mocked the Whigs‟ nonpartisan stance as a cowardly retreat from their 
principles.  By refusing to tell the electorate what they stood for, the Whigs debased themselves 
to petty office seekers who could only win the election with a personality centered campaign as 
in 1840.
106
  While the Democrats never failed to taunt the Whigs about their nonpartisanship, 
they directed their harshest attacks at the Free Soilers.  The Democratic Review scoffed at Van 
Buren‟s newfound anti-slavery beliefs in light of his past.  He stood beneath a banner of free 
speech yet his tie-breaking vote as vice president, in 1835, had allowed South Carolina 
postmasters to remove abolitionist literature from the mail.  Being a cynical politician, Van 
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Buren voted for censorship to solicit Southern support for his 1836 presidential bid.
107
  Now, 
after losing out on the 1844 nomination, Van Buren ran solely for revenge upon Southern 
Democrats.
108
  The Democratic Review blasted these apostates who would only siphon votes 
from Cass.  “With what consistency can these men pretend…the advocacy of „free soil,‟ when 
they pursue a course calculated to throw the government…into the hands, for four years, of 
federalists under a slave holding leader?‟109  The Free Soilers could not win as a third-party, but 
even more dangerous were their principles: “if carried out” they would “inevitably lead to the 
disunion of the states.” 110  Yet, the sharp prose clearly exemplified Democrats‟ frustration.  They 
had a solution to the issue of slavery‟s expansion consistent with the principle justification for 
expansion, expanding freedom and democracy, yet the Free Soilers could render it all irrelevant.  
The unified framework of Manifest Destiny seemed unable to strengthen Democrats‟ electoral 
appeal.  Instead, it became a sharp weapon wielded against them.   
The Whigs deployed primarily a two-pronged approach.  They responded to Democratic 
mockery of their principles with old charges, Democratic support for executive tyranny and 
corruption.  The “usurping dynasty”, the Polk Administration, had thwarted the stimulation and 
protection of industry and internal improvements with “twenty vetoes.”  In place of substantive 
issues the Democrats had substituted buzz-phrases such as “the extension of our empire” and 
“the freedom of trade” to justify the Mexican War which turned the land of freedom into a 
“community of land pirates.”111  Furthermore, recent events validated charges of Democratic 
debauchery.  Democratic chieftains marginalized those unsupportive of the party‟s new direction 
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[the Van Burenites] and rewarded the party hack Cass with a presidential nomination.  In his 
demands for all of Oregon and loyal support for Polk‟s war, Cass represented the Democratic 
creed, “war, conquest, and forced aggrandizement.”112  Cass‟s election would surely continue 
such horrid polices.  By contrast, Whigs cheered that “Taylor is no partisan.”113  This upstanding 
soldier stood for good government, meaning Congressional supremacy and sparing use of the 
veto.  There would be no wars of aggression or acting above the law with Taylor as president 
because, “The Whigs desire to preserve peace with all the world, to stimulate the industry, and to 
develop the resources of the country.”114  The Whigs said little of interest because they were 
depending on Taylor‟s popularity and the Democratic split.  
While Democrats and Whigs sought ambiguity or silence on the expansion of slavery 
issue, the Free Soilers adopted a clear position: “You are either for slavery or you are against 
it.”115  The Free Soilers made two interlinked arguments to Northern voters: the corrupt parties 
survived by obstructing debate on slavery.  The South “hithero ruled the republic with a rod of 
iron” with seven slave owners, counting Polk, occupying the presidency [Washington, Jefferson, 
Madison, Monroe, Jackson, Tyler].  The Democracy‟s complicity in forwarding Southern 
interests seemed so obvious that recounting its subservience appeared unnecessary.  Popular 
sovereignty merely represented Northern Democrats‟ latest sleight of hand to avoid discussing 
slavery and paying the electoral price.  The deceitful Whigs were an equally bad option.  
Arguments about Taylor‟s nonpartisanship were disingenuous at best and outright denial at 
worst.  Taylor was a slave owner and everyone knew it.  As a party, the Whigs had no program 
to stop slavery‟s expansion because Taylor would never allow it.  The pithy description of the 
                                                          
112
 “The Whigs and their Candidate,” American Whig Review, vol. 8 no. 3 (Sept. 1848) 225. 
113
 Ibid., 232. 
114
 National Intelligencer 20 July 1848 quoted in Silbey, Party Over Section, 113. 
115





candidates, “one is a Northern man with Southern principles, and the other is a Southern man 
with Southern principles” encapsulates the Free Soilers appeal to Northerners.116  The Free 
Soilers permitted what had heretofore been an almost impossible electoral decision for 
Northerners, disapproving of slavery and its expansion and expressing such sentiments.   
The Free Soilers had a solution which the Democrats denied and the Whigs lacked the 
votes to pass, Congressional action.  Congress exercised power over slavery‟s expansion into the 
territories by barring slavery from the old Northwest with the Northwest Ordinances of 1787 and 
1789 and the 1820 Missouri Compromise confined slavery south of the 36-30 line in the 
Louisiana Purchase territory.  Moreover, those who denied such Congressional power also 
denied the intent of the Founders.  The Free Soil platform declared “the entire history of that 
period [post American Revolution], clearly show that it was the settled policy of the nation, not 
to extend, nationalize, or encourage, but to limit, localize, and discourage Slavery” [emphasis in 
the original].
117
  Congress had the power and it should exercise it in the Mexican Cession.  The 
Free Soilers correctly claimed that the parties survived by abdicating any responsibility to 
legislate on slavery and then claiming impotence on the question to placate Southerners.  The 
vast territorial expansion no longer made such a course plausible, or even responsible.  Congress 
could, and should, block slavery‟s expansion into the Mexican Cession. 
Cass lost, and not because of the Free Soilers.  The Free Soilers undoubtedly cost Cass 
New York but they also cost Taylor Indiana and Ohio which held thirty-five electoral votes (one 
less than New York).  Instead, Pennsylvania, where the Free Soilers had a negligible impact, 
made the difference.  Polk and young Democrats managed to substantially reduce the high tariff 
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of 1842 which Pennsylvania, with its coal and pig iron districts, supported.  A bad economy 
coupled with this turn towards free trade pushed Pennsylvania‟s twenty-six electoral votes into 
the Whig column and cost Cass the election.
118
  His loss also reveals Manifest Destiny‟s 
paradox.  Ideologically, Manifest Destiny kept Democrats together by not elevating one section‟s 
interest above another‟s.  Polk trampled on this idea by provoking a war with Mexico 
presumably to accrue land for slave states while compromising on free territory (Oregon).  
Southern belligerence to an assertion of Northern interest, the Wilmot Proviso, proved too much 
for Van Burenites, who formed the Free Soil Party.  Manifest Destiny progressively appeared to 
be a slaveholder‟s boon and the free majority‟s burden, a very un-Democratic idea. 
Truce at Midcentury, 1850. 
Organizing the territories with or without slavery consumed the first session of the 31
st
 
Congress from December 1849 to September 1850.  Bitter divisions from the election lingered 
and quickly surfaced, first in the House.  For three weeks no candidate for Speaker could attain a 
majority and orators gained the floor, in the midst of the disorder, to rant about the fate of the 
territories.  Angry rhetoric reached a new level as Georgia Whig Robert Toombs swore before 
the House, the country, and “in the presence of the living God that if by your legislation you seek 
to drive us from the territories of California and New Mexico…I am for disunion.”119  The 
Senate at least proved more eloquent as young Democrats yielded to the still dominant Great 
Triumvirate of Clay, Calhoun, and Webster.  On January 29th, Clay proposed resolutions which 
formed the compromise: admit California as a free state, organize the New Mexico territory 
without restrictions on slavery, shrink Texas‟ land in exchange for debt relief, and abolish the 
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slave trade in Washington D.C.
120
  On March 4th, Calhoun gave his final speech on the subject 
of equilibrium.  The North‟s rapid growth had destroyed sectional equilibrium, threatening to 
render the South a permanent minority, unable to protect slavery.  Accordingly, Calhoun called 
on the North to grant concessions if it desired continued union.
121
  Invariably, Calhoun meant 
ceding some of the new territories to the South in order to maintain sectional equilibrium in the 
Senate.  On March 7th, Webster countered the festering sectionalism with a nationalist appeal.  
After denying the possibility of “peaceable secession”, he criticized secession‟s supporters for 
not contemplating its ramifications: 
Why, what would be the result?...What is to remain American? What am I to be? An 
American no longer? Am I to become a sectional man, a local man, a separatist, with no 
country in common with the gentlemen who sit around me here, or who fill the other 
house of Congress? Heaven forbid!...Why, Sir, our ancestors, our fathers and our 
grandfathers…would rebuke and reproach us; and our children and our grandchildren 
would cry out, Shame upon us!  If we of this generation should dishonor…the harmony 
of that Union which is every day felt among us with so much joy and gratitude.
122
 
Webster reiterated an old message, American identity and the Union were inseparable.  Yet, the 
events in Congress only seemed to confirm the paradox of Manifest Destiny particularly in the 
way both parties split over the fruits of expansion.  Northern Whigs and Southern Democrats 
opposed any compromise for opposite reasons, commitment to slavery‟s exclusion and extension 
respectively.  Northern Democrats and Southern Whigs supported a compromise but Southern 
Whigs were slow to accept Northern Democrats‟ solution of popular sovereignty.  Clay‟s 
legislative tactics, packaging the bills into an omnibus, also proved problematic.  The omnibus 
guaranteed a simultaneous vote on concessions and gains for each section yet no pro-
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compromise majority had materialized.  On July 31st, the omnibus‟ opponents unraveled it by 
striking parts of the bill.
123
  The man who helped weather so many crises, Clay, was beaten.   
 Douglas realized the compromise failed because of a tactical error and not because of a 
defect in the legislation.  Instead, Douglas employed the strategy Clay used in 1820, de-link the 
bills.  If allowed to vote on the bills separately, a sectional phalanx with additional support plus 
abstentions from the opposition could secure compromise in piece-meal form.  The results 
validated Douglas‟s reasoning.  All voting Southerners in both houses of Congress approved the 
fugitive slave law and all voting Northerners supported California‟s admission.124  Regarding 
abstentions, fifteen of the twenty-one abstaining senators on the fugitive slave law were 
Northerners and six of the eight abstaining senators on California‟s admission were 
Southerners.
125
  On partisan lines, Northern Democrats and particularly young Democrats were 
the compromise‟s strongest supporters.  Five young Democrats, counting Cass, voted yes on five 
bills while abstaining, or in Augustus Dodge‟s case voting yes on the fugitive slave law: 
Douglas, Bright, Shields, Cass, and Dodge of Iowa.  Other Democrats assisted them; Texas‟ Sam 
Houston, Pennsylvania‟s Daniel Sturgeon, Michigan‟s Alpheus Felch, and New Hampshire‟s 
Moses Norris voted yes on all six measures.
126
  Southern young Democrats, Florida‟s David 
Yulee and Louisiana‟s Pierre Soulé, acquiesced to popular sovereignty in the Utah and New 
Mexico territories by either voting yes or abstaining.
127
  Ironically, it took sectionalism to power 
an anti-sectional settlement which resolved a sectional clash over a partisan war‟s spoils. 
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Chapter 3: Downfall 
“And the stars of Heaven shall fall, and the powers that are in Heaven shall be shaken.” Mark 13:25 
With the Compromise of 1850, territorial expansion could resume.  Young America next 
eyed Cuba, an annexation target of early American administrations, whose location, ninety miles 
from Florida, allowed annexation to appear part of continental conquest.  Living beneath the 
yoke of monarchical Catholic Spain satisfied all the requisite anti-democratic criteria necessary 
for American intervention beneath the banner of Manifest Destiny.  Also, bisectional support 
from empire-minded Northerners and land-hungry Southerners could potentially mute sectional 
squabbling about additional slave states.  Yet, the paradox of Manifest Destiny again appeared as 
Northerners and Southerners fundamentally disagreed about the reason for annexation.  A recent 
wave of emancipation in the West Indies had considerably aroused Southern anxieties about 
slavery‟s security.  However, emancipation also stemmed from the liberal revolutions in Europe 
that deposed monarchs, much to Northerners‟ ebullience about a new democratic age in Europe.  
Would annexing Cuba manifest the democratic United States‟ newly cultivated power or be a 
reactionary move to save Cuban slavery?  Young Democrats‟ crucial mistakes, ranging from 
Soulé‟s behavior to Douglas‟ fateful Kansas-Nebraska Act, indicated the latter and thus 
prevented annexation.  The expansionist press kept the idea of annexation alive throughout the 
1850s, but annexation never regained traction particularly as the sectional crisis deepened.  With 
the colossal repudiation of failed annexation, the era of expansion and ascendency of Young 







Paradise Lost: the Quest for Cuba- Expansion Part- IV, 1853-1859 
American designs on Cuba predated Manifest Destiny and Young America.  With a 
magnificent port facing the American coastline and a perfect climate for crops such as sugar, 
Cuba represented an idyllic territory for annexation particularly, for Southern planters.  Indeed, 
Democratic-Republicans had obsessed over Cuba.  Thomas Jefferson had believed it held the key 
to the Louisiana territory‟s security and President Madison had attempted to purchase Cuba in 
1810.
128
   President Monroe opted for aggressive diplomacy spearheaded by Secretary of State 
John Quincy Adams.  Adams threatened American recognition of the rebellious provinces of 
New Spain unless Spain agreed to sell East Florida.  Spain capitulated in the Adams- Onís Treaty 
of 1819 and swapped Florida for American boundary claims in the western edges of the 
Louisiana Purchase (Texas).
129
  Yet, Adams did not view Florida as the end of American 
expansion.   
Adams foreshadowed the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny by labeling Puerto Rico and Cuba 
as “natural appendages of the North American continent.”  Once free from Spain, given the 
ongoing insurrections in New Spain, Adams reasoned that Cuba would be unable to support 
itself and could “gravitate only towards the North American Union.”130  The primary issue 
remained European, primarily British, interference despite the Monroe Doctrine (written by 
Adams) declaring the new republics off-limits to re-colonization.  However, British abolitionism 
continued to hang over the Cuba question because the Royal Navy actively suppressed the 
African slave trade in which Spain continued to participate.  Britain had already conquered Cuba 
once, during the Seven Years War, and recent slave uprisings were demonstrating the Spanish 
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were struggling to control the island.  What would stop Britain from ending the African slave 
trade into Cuba with a blockade which could inadvertently catalyze a potentially successful slave 
uprising?
131
  The Caribbean already had one black republic born from slave revolt (Haiti): it did 
not need another, particularly one ninety miles from the South.  Yet, a crusade for Cuba beneath 
the Monroe Doctrine seemed infeasible.  The nation was still recouping from a disastrous war, 
had defused a major sectional crisis, and remained caught in a depression which began in 1819.  
For the moment, Southerners and the nation exercised restraint. 
American designs on Cuba subsided for two decades as major domestic issues consumed 
the late 1820s and 1830s: South Carolina‟s nullification of a federal tariff, Indian removal, the 
destruction of the Second Bank of the United States, and the depression of 1837.  Polk 
reawakened visions of an active foreign policy by reviving the Monroe Doctrine in a different 
context.  In his first annual message to Congress, Polk expressed hostility towards European 
powers in nationalist terms.  Twenty-two years since the Monroe Doctrine had been issued, “the 
expansion of free principles and our rising greatness as a nation are attracting the attention of the 
powers of Europe.”  That attention brought about the threat of a “ „balance of power‟ ” system 
imposed “on this continent to check our advancement.”132  Under such duress, expansion into the 
open spaces of North America represented a logical response.  Contrary to O‟Sullivan‟s passive 
“let destiny unfold” model, Polk pursued a course of action affirming that the nation needed 
aggressive expansion to guarantee its security.  European meddling in South America and 
particularly British designs on Texas, real or imagined, proved useful propaganda for demagogue 
politicians and fodder for expansionist newspapers seeking to inflame public opinion.
133
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Manifest Destiny offered convenient rhetoric to cover a calculated policy decision.  However, 
some young Democrats wanted to take a radical step, exporting republicanism to Europe. 
  By the mid-1840s, young Democrats believed the nation had a role to play in foreign 
affairs.  The republican character of the United States gave it a unique position on the world 
stage vis-à-vis Europe, where republicanism roiled beneath the surface of monarchical 
stability.
134
  The onset of revolution in the spring of 1848, beginning as usual in France, seemed 
an ominous sign of a new age in Europe.  The New York Herald ecstatically declared, 
“throughout the continent, the materials of democracy will be in a most inflammatory condition 
now that France, the great ruling nation of the continent, has thrown down her race of kings, and 
stands before the world as a republic, on the plan of the United States” [italics added].135  In 
Congress, young Democrats put on quite a show of support for France and other European 
republicans, with Douglas acting as leader.  When Calhoun argued against Allen‟s resolution 
congratulating France for becoming a republic, because he believed the new government might 
not endure, Douglas responded promptly and forcefully.  Denunciations from autocratic Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia would not deter France, Douglas thundered.  But the French were “deeply 
interested” in American opinion “because the United States of America is the only republic upon 
Earth.”  Douglas then laid bare young Democrats‟ feelings about the upheaval in Europe: “All 
republicans throughout the world have their eyes fixed upon us…Our success is the foundation 
of all their hopes.”136  Refusing to show solidarity would betray American republican ideals in 
the name of maintaining the archaic doctrine of non-interference, and Allen‟s resolution 
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  Young America‟s prophecy of a new republican age gained credence when 
The New York Herald reported that Austria and Prussia had fallen, “Germany may be a grand 
federal republic before the middle of summer.”138  Surely Spain would fall next.  From there, the 
expansionist impulse could be galvanized. 
Cuba lurked behind young Democrats‟ support for the revolutions engulfing Europe.  
With France now a republic, the New York Herald prophesized: “We anticipate a revolution…in 
Spain.”139  Without France to protect it, as in 1823 when French soldiers restored King 
Ferdinand, a major impediment to annexing Cuba disappeared.  Seeing an opportunity, Douglas 
and O‟Sullivan met with Polk in early May to discuss annexing Cuba.  With the Mexican War 
concluded, O‟Sullivan argued that “further delay now would be criminal.”  While O‟Sullivan did 
not condone violent seizure, he believed Spain would sell and Britain would not interfere given 
the chaos in Europe.
140
  Southern expansionists joined in with the national security argument of 
commanding “the basin of the Mississippi River”, the Gulf of Mexico.141  Under British control, 
Havana would become a nest of British warships with Cuba serving as a crucial base of force 
projection in a third Anglo-American war.  Calhoun, involved in efforts to acquire Cuba as 
Monroe‟s Secretary of War, stressed the national security argument by labeling Cuba 
“indispensible to the safety of the United States.”   Yet Calhoun‟s comfort with continued 
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possession of Cuba by the slaveholding Spanish betrayed his and other Southerners‟ sectional 
feelings.
142
  They would never allow a non-slaveholding power to occupy Cuba. 
The liberal revolutions not only overthrew monarchies but retrograde institutions such as 
slavery: the French and Danish abolition of bondage in their West Indian possessions made all 
but the Dutch and Spanish colonies in the Caribbean free.
143
  Would a republican Spain free its 
slaves or, worse, would the British seize Cuba and abolish slavery with Spain so weak?  West 
Indian economics made British intervention probable because Jamaican sugar planters could not 
compete with Cuban sugar planters using slave labor.  South Carolina‟s Greenville Mountaineer 
noted that the “utter failure of emancipation in Jamaica” led to a two-pronged British plan for 
competing in the sugar market: placing tariffs on slave produced sugar and emancipating slave 
territory to equalize the market and means of production.
144
  Yet this debate remained largely 
internal to Southern society and beneath national security arguments.  Southerners shared 
Northerners‟ republican feelings, and vilifying newly republican European governments for 
abolishing slavery, particularly France, seemed counter-productive.  Appealing to American 
idealism, the liberal nature of the revolutions made annexation of Cuba appear nothing more than 
a cynical ploy to save slavery.  For the moment, designs on Cuba stalled. 
The Polk Administration‟s behavior and the European uprisings in 1848 complicated the 
paradox of Manifest Destiny and the importance of Cuba.  In 1823, the Monroe Doctrine 
addressed an immediate issue, prospective re-colonization of Latin America by Spain.  
Importantly, it took a defensive posture with a passive character.
145
  Polk, supported by young 
Democrats, inverted the Monroe Doctrine by preempting the question of European intent on 
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North America.  The annexation of Texas, settlement of the Oregon boundary, and Mexican War 
had been justified as defensive actions undertaken in the name of protecting North America from 
European colonization.  Expanding republicanism into space kept the Europeans out and 
solidified the United States‟ position in North America.146  Manifest Destiny represented an 
ideological justification: national security rested on expansion and incorporation of new states as 
equals in the American polity.  This model, the antithesis of hierarchical European colonialism, 
usually worked passively.  Yet, Polk‟s assumption of European interference led to positive action 
in order to prevent such impending threats, real or fictitious.  However, the uprisings in Europe 
posed a different problem.  The threat of European intervention in North America seemed remote 
with republicans in charge, but that did not preclude a clash of interests.  On what republican 
nationalist grounds could the United States now justify annexing Cuba?      
By 1851, European monarchies had quashed the uprisings and the United States remained 
the premier republican power in reality and self-perception.  The Democrats‟ victory in the 1852 
presidential election reinvigorated its designs on Cuba beneath the republican banner of Manifest 
Destiny.  New Hampshire‟s Franklin Pierce, another dark horse, crushed the Whigs‟ newest war 
hero, General Winfield Scott, 254 to 42 in the Electoral College while the Democrats amassed 
huge Congressional majorities.  The divisions from 1844 and 1848 seemed buried with the Van 
Burenites back in the fold and Young America occupying a prominent position.  The time 
seemed right for a renewed expansionist foreign policy.  In the aftermath of Pierce‟s election, the 
Democratic Review bluntly stated, “We are for taking possession of the island now.”147  
Moreover, The New York Herald asserted that conquering Cuba might prove a springboard to 
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conquering Haiti and subordinating it to the white race.
148
  An enervated Whig opposition and 
tremendous amount of political capital seemed to make annexing Cuba possible if not inevitable.  
The main issue remained the means of annexation. 
Secretary of State William Marcy ordered Soulé, the new minister to Spain, not to 
approach Spain with an offer for Cuba.  The island must “„release itself or be released‟” and 
annexation would follow.  Yet, the iconoclastic Louisiana young Democrat seemed more intent 
on honoring his New York supporters who urged him to “bring back „a new star‟ to „shine in the 
sky of Young America‟” than obeying orders from his diplomatic superiors.149  Among a series 
of outlandish episodes, he dueled and wounded the French minister.  Soulé‟s means to obtain 
Cuba proved equally unorthodox, such as circumventing normal diplomatic channels by 
appealing directly to the Queen Mother to sell Cuba.
150
  When he made no progress with Spanish 
officials, Soulé tapped his republican connections by funding Spanish rebels who would sell 
Cuba if the monarchy fell.  When the summer uprising failed, all of the captured republicans 
implicated Soulé and the Pierce Administration by extension.
151
  Despite this embarrassment, a 
setback for Young America‟s foreign policy of supporting republicanism, Soulé remained intent 
on acquiring Cuba.  Acting on a suggestion by Marcy, Soulé convened with minister to Britain 
James Buchanan and minister to France John Mason in the Belgian town of Ostend in early 
October 1854 to discuss Cuba policy.  The timing for annexation seemed ideal with France and 
England embroiled in the Crimean War with Russia.  Rather than proceed quietly, Soulé decided 
on making a bold written statement.  Under Spanish control, Cuba represented a “permanent 
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cause of anxiety and alarm” with all the possibilities of becoming another Haiti.  Should Cuba 
ever pose an imminent threat to American security, “we shall be justified in wresting it from 
Spain.”152  The so-called Ostend Manifesto did not remain private for long, the New York Herald 
got wind of it through European contacts.  Pierce and young Democrats now had a Cuba crisis, 
in addition to a domestic crisis, on their hands. 
 At home, the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its aftershocks severely undermined annexation 
efforts.  Douglas, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Territories, wrote the bill intending to 
organize the remaining Louisiana Purchase Territory.  Douglas had the larger goal of attaining a 
transcontinental railroad route through the Kansas-Nebraska territory with a crucial terminus at 
Chicago.  Instead, Southern Democrats insisted that Douglas‟ bill repeal the Missouri 
Compromise (the Kansas territory lay above the 36-30 line making it free territory since 1820) as 
the price of their support, and a violent sectional debate erupted.  Northerners, Democrat and 
Whig alike, bellowed that the South had no interest in keeping slavery a local institution in a free 
continent.  Instead, slave owners now demanded that Congress protect slavery by enslaving free 
land, and young Democrats under Douglas‟ direction aided and abetted this travesty.  Northern 
Democrats might have acquiesced to adding already enslaved Cuba beneath the banner of 
Manifest Destiny, but as one newspaper stated, “the Nebraska wrong has forever rendered 
annexation impossible.”153  Northern voters verified such sentiments by sweeping sixty-six 
House Northern Democrats out of office in the midterm elections.
154
  The South now became the 
majority section in the Democracy, but Northern public opinion had shifted against further 
expansion for slave owners‟ benefits.  
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 News of the Ostend Manifesto elicited a virulent reaction from Northern public opinion 
that scorned it as indefensible theft.
155
  Divided public opinion, based on section, revealed what 
seemed increasingly apparent, Democrats‟ negative vision of government was fraying.  That 
vision which had united young Democrats, Jacksonians, and Southerners was primarily 
economic in character, free trade and local democratic polities pursuing their economic interests 
free from government interference.  The vision did note that the maximization of each group‟s 
interest, economically and politically, lay within the Union.  However, territorial expansion 
invariably invoked the issue of who benefited from adding new lands.  The Kansas-Nebraska 
conflict and poorly executed efforts to buy Cuba eviscerated the notion that expansion did not 
concern sectional interest.  Sectional interest became more powerful when positive action or law 
became necessary, an outgrowth of Manifest Destiny‟s paradox. 
The uproar over the Kansas-Nebraska Act and Ostend Manifesto did not end Democratic 
desires for Cuba.  A remnant of the expansionist press still spearheaded by the Democratic 
Review and The New York Herald kept debate alive in the North.  In a way, Cuba represented a 
diversion from Northern Democrats‟ seemingly unceasing troubles; the violence in Kansas, the 
new and purely sectional Republican Party‟s alarmingly strong showing in the 1856 presidential 
election, and the Supreme Court‟s nullification of popular sovereignty in Dred Scott v. Sandford.  
The New York Herald proved the most persistent advocate for annexing Cuba during the 
Buchanan Administration (1857-1861).  It repeated two old refrains, political expediency and 
national security.  First, annexation was “long a popular measure with the masses.”156  Second, 
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Cuba was “necessary to our development and nothing can prevent its coming into this Union.”157  
The Democratic Review concurred and reiterated its belief in the nation‟s manifest destiny in a 
lengthy article which reviewed American policy towards Spain and Cuba since the Louisiana 
Purchase.  It tried to prove that Cuba would eventually enter the Union and that Cuba 
represented “one additional step towards accomplishment of that great end” of fulfilling the 
nation‟s manifest destiny which the Democratic Review had championed since 1845.158  Yet, 
both The New York Herald and Democratic Review said little of interest.  They hid behind the 
vagueness of inevitability, understandable given the dangers of appearing to support slavery.  
Furthermore, the violence between non-slaveholders and slaveholders in Kansas had complicated 
the political situation.  The corollary of Manifest Destiny and young Democrats‟ favorite means 
to curtail sectionalism, popular sovereignty, was losing its legitimacy.   
What the expansionist press said and what Northern Democrats did amounted to two 
different things.  Under Douglas‟s direction, Northern Democrats continued to insist on the 
political expediency of popular sovereignty despite Dred Scott v. Sandford and pressure from 
Buchanan.  Douglas led the floor battle against Southern efforts, supported by Buchanan, to 
admit Kansas as a slave state after a fraudulent election established a pro-slavery territorial 
government which wrote a pro-slavery constitution for Kansas.  The Charleston Mercury, 
Calhoun‟s old organ, cut through the rhetoric.  If the Northern Democrats could not and would 
not deliver Kansas as a slave-state, how could they deliver Cuba?
159
  Despite the party platform 
calling for the administration to “insure our ascendency in the Gulf of Mexico” nothing 
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  The simple fact remained that Northern Democrats had to answer 
Republicans‟ ever more effective charge of subservience to slave owning oligarchs.  Notably, 
Douglas barely won reelection in 1858 and did so by hurling racist epithets at his relatively 
unknown “Black Republican” opponent, Abraham Lincoln.  Policies which young Democrats 
had advocated, and seemingly had previously enjoyed tremendous public support, now seemed 
major detriments.  The Democracy entered the election year of 1860 in a sorry state. 
The Price of Paradox: The Democracy’s Peril in Charleston, Late April 1860.  
 If any Northern Democrat could stand up to the South and win the presidential 
nomination it would be Douglas.  Young America‟s leader had three major legislative victories 
to his name by 1860: the Compromise of 1850, the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the defeat of 
Kansas‟ admission as a slave state in 1858.  Furthermore, Douglas had led young Democrats‟ 
fight for the political expediency of popular sovereignty.  Yet the convention did not promise any 
easy victories.  Southerners would be at home in Charleston, South Carolina, and Alabama‟s 
William Yancey, the leader of the 1848 walkout, would head up the South‟s uncompromising 
wing [the fire-eaters].  Importantly, Yancey would have support from the galleries which he 
lacked twelve years earlier when he took Alabama out of the 1848 convention.  The ongoing 
feud between Buchanan and Douglas was another problem.  Buchanan had not forgotten how 
Douglas and his lieutenants had prevented Kansas‟s admission, and Louisiana‟s John Slidell 
would command the administration‟s forces bent on blocking Douglas‟ nomination.161  Tensions 
simmered as the delegates filed into Charleston.   
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 Douglas‟s convention cadre landed in Charleston with a majority of the delegates pledged 
to Douglas; New England, New York, New Jersey, the Northwest, and a smattering of delegates 
from Pennsylvania and the Border South.  Yet, Douglas could not reach the two-thirds 
supermajority if the cotton and upper South remained united in resistance.  Alabama‟s state 
legislature had again instructed its delegates to leave if the nominee did not embrace federal 
protection for slavery, and other Southern States seemed more receptive to a walkout this time 
around.
162
  The primary issue for negotiation would be the power of territorial legislatures over 
slavery.  Douglas trod a fine line by offering a sedition bill, criminalizing criticism of slavery, as 
an olive branch to the South in the ongoing Congressional session while refusing to repudiate 
popular sovereignty.
163
  Instead, Douglas circumvented Dred Scott v. Sandford‟s nullification of 
popular sovereignty with the “Freeport Doctrine”: territorial legislatures could bar slavery by not 
passing legislation protecting the institution.
164
  The cotton South would not give in so easily.  
The Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas delegations 
privately met before the convention started and endorsed the Alabama platform.
165
  Douglas 
could either capitulate to a federal slave code for the territories or they would leave.   
The convention opened on April 23rd with the usual arguing about rules consuming the 
first three days with a major problem resulting: Douglas‟ men had agreed to approve the 
platform before choosing a nominee (a deviation from precedent).  They had tethered the 
nomination to popular sovereignty‟s validity.  While Douglas‟ majority could impose the 
platform on the South, Southern unity with pro-administration forces could prevent Douglas‟s 
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nomination.  On April 27th, the problems began when the committee responsible for drafting the 
platform failed to reach an agreement.  With all state delegations represented, Southern 
committeemen and allies from California and Oregon held a majority.  They insisted that 
territorial legislatures could not inhibit slavery‟s introduction into the territory, or abolish it in a 
territory, or impair property rights.  Northern Democrats disagreed but were willing to refer the 
question of a territorial legislature‟s power over slavery to the Supreme Court, another peace 
offering to the South.  This concession did not satisfy Southerners who had forsaken the negative 
freedom vision on which the Democratic alliance had rested for thirty-two years.  Southerners 
now affirmed the federal power over slavery they had bitterly contested for decades, whether it 
was South Carolina nullifying the 1828 federal tariff or resisting the Wilmot Proviso.  The 
majority report stated: “That it is the duty of the Federal Government to protect when necessary, 
the rights of persons and property on the high seas, in the Territories, or wherever else its 
Constitutional authority extends” [italics added].  The minority report, supported by all free state 
committeemen, reaffirmed popular sovereignty‟s validity although Northern Democrats would 
assent to any Supreme Court decision on the subject.
166
  Once out of committee, the platform 
debate neared the anticipated climax. 
The introduction of the majority and minority reports for the platforms that night incurred 
an angry debate.  For ninety minutes Yancey vented Southern frustrations by lambasting the 
Northwest‟s continued allegiance to popular sovereignty, with thunderous applause occasionally 
interrupting his tirade.  Yancey blasted Douglas for defeating the enslavement of Kansas and his 
circumvention of Dred Scott v. Sandford.  Such a turncoat was no friend of the South.  
Furthermore, Yancey insisted that only federal power could restrain a tyrannical Northern 
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majority and guarantee the South her rights in the territories.  Ohio‟s George Pugh gave the 
Northern response to Southern bullying.  Northern Democrats were the South‟s allies, but 
Northerners would not sacrifice popular sovereignty thereby opening themselves up to more 
Republican attacks.  “Gentlemen of the South, you mistake us-you mistake us-we will not do 
it.”167  With no agreement close, and tiring of stalemate, the Douglas cadre prepared to call a 
vote on the platform.  Sensing the end neared, Southerners filibustered to force another day of 
negotiation and the extra day ultimately amounted to more failed bargaining.
168
   
On April 30
th
 the Douglas cadre swapped the minority report for the majority report to be 
the platform, 165-138,  with New England, New York, the Northwest, most of New Jersey, a 
minority of Pennsylvania, and a smattering of upper South delegates carrying the vote.  The 
North had won, but it agreed to the concession of abiding by any Supreme Court ruling on 
popular sovereignty.  With a pro-Douglas platform now inevitable Arkansas, Texas, Georgia, 
Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida refused to vote on Northerners‟ latest concession.  As an 
added enticement, the majority agreed to write Democratic support for the annexation of Cuba 
into the platform.  The same states refused to vote.
169
  Cuba meant little if slavery did not have 
explicit protections, and the break between the positive and negative visions now came to 
fruition.  On a motion to lay the platform on the table for final approval, Stuart of Michigan 
lambasted the non-voting Southern states.  Northern Democrats had ceded much to Southerners 
in the past and had yet again made concessions, which only six years ago Southerners had 
embraced (annexing Cuba).  If pro-Douglas men were sick of Southern obstruction and willing 
to let a few delegates leave, the administration forces needed the fire-eaters in the convention.  
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Slidell met with Yancey the previous night, imploring him to stay with his troops and fight 
Douglas‟ nomination.  However, the orders had been given and Alabama exited after Stuart‟s 
speech but to the Douglas cadre‟s surprise Alabama had support.  Mississippi, Louisiana, South 
Carolina, Arkansas, Florida, and Texas walked out with each round of Southern oratory 
generating applause from the galleries.  When Georgia left the next morning, eight Southern 
states in all, seven of whom would form the Confederacy in less than a year, had bolted.
170
  After 
narrowly escaping disruption in 1844 and 1848, the Democracy now shattered. 
The Rising Tide: Douglas Invades the South for the Union, Summer and Autumn 1860 
 The Democratic split did not heal.  In two separate conventions each section nominated 
its own candidate, Kentucky‟s John Breckinridge (Buchanan‟s vice-president) for the South and 
Douglas for the North.  Recognizing the peril the Union faced, Douglas decided to break with 
tradition by stumping for the presidency and the preservation of the Union.  Beginning in mid-
July, he spoke in New York and New England before heading into the upper South.  In Norfolk, 
Virginia on August 25th, Douglas denied the South had any right to secede based on Lincoln‟s 
election.  Echoing Jackson during the nullification crisis thirty year earlier, Douglas declared the 
president would be justified in enforcing the laws if any states attempted to secede.
171
  In 
Raleigh, North Carolina five days later Douglas linked popular sovereignty to the survival of the 
Union.  On this democratic principle “the peace and harmony of the country can be maintained 
and the perpetuity of the Union ensured.”172  From the upper South, Douglas headed home to 
Illinois to encourage his faithful supporters.  The favorite son could prevail if the Northwest held 
and enough Union-loving men crushed the abolitionists and secessionists at the ballot box across 
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the country.  The October 9th state elections proved disheartening as Republicans swept state 
offices in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Ohio.
173
  With Lincoln‟s victory seemingly assured, 
Douglas decided to speak in the Deep South.   
After a brief stopover in Tennessee, Douglas spoke in Atlanta, Georgia on October 30
th
.  
The Southern press had been fuming for days about Lincoln‟s impending election and how any 
loyal Southerner would support secession, while secessionist orators such as Georgia‟s Robert 
Toombs had all but urged armed resistance to Douglas and his pro-Union message.  Undeterred, 
Douglas reiterated that secession in response to Lincoln‟s election was treason and resistance by 
the federal government would be justified.
174
  After a few days of speaking around Georgia, 
Douglas arrived in the heart of secessionism, Montgomery, Alabama.  Despite published threats 
against him in the press, he spoke from the steps of the state capital (soon to be, however briefly, 
the Confederacy‟s capital) on November 2nd.  With Yancey in attendance, Douglas attacked 
Alabama‟s fire-eaters for triggering not just the convention walkout but the recent “conspiracy 
on foot to break up this Union.”   Appealing directly to the people, Douglas called on 
Southerners to “rally around the principle of non-intervention, and we will crush our Northern 
abolitionism and Southern disunion.”175  On November 6th, the day after Douglas concluded his 
campaign in Mobile, Alabama, Lincoln won the election.  Douglas‟s herculean effort had failed.  
After a brief stopover in New Orleans where he met with supporters led by Soulé, Douglas 
headed home.
176
  Another Congressional session beckoned in December and he would lead the 
compromise effort with Democratic majorities in the House and the Senate, Lincoln had won an 
empty victory.  In a little over a month South Carolina would secede, within three months the 
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Confederacy would come into existence, within four months Congressional conciliation would 
fail, within five months four more states would secede, and within seven months the man who 
embodied Young America would die. 
Epilogue: The Day Manifest Destiny Died 
“And the third angel sounded, and there fell a great star from Heaven, burning as it were a lamp.” 
Revelations 8:10 
  In 1845, Americans chased continental dreams.  Young Democrats believed that adding 
land would regenerate the American democracy and freedom that both sections shared and 
venerated.  By embracing free development in land and principle, they sought to intensify the 
United States‟ inherent greatness as a republic of free men.  What the sections did not share in 
the way of domestic institutions, they shared in abstractions essential to American nationality.  
Young Democrats, while bombastic, used the vagueness inherent in ideology as a means to unite 
the party and the nation.  Their fathers‟ country was inward looking and unsure of itself, nearly 
torn apart by the War of 1812 and Missouri Compromise debates.  In response, the nation fell 
back on agrarianism.  The Whig economic program, entailing hierarchy and government 
direction, represented another version of such anxieties: democracy could never lead to national 
greatness.  A nation needed direction from above for effective development according to the 
Whigs‟ vision. Young Democrats rejected these visions in favor of something far different, 
sanctification.  Manifest Destiny took the Puritan idea of election and secularized it, finding the 
United States‟ election in its democratic character: democracy represented the new truth in the 
New Israel (North America).  Knit together by contiguous space and the democratic 





vital building blocks towards forming coherent national interests and nationhood.  Local interest 
became state interests which then conglomerated into national interests, with all persons finding 
common cause as Americans.  The integrity of the Union was not subject to debate. 
Something had changed by 1861.  Why did the Democratic alliance, long successful, 
collapse?  By changing Democratic positions, young Democrats changed the foundation for the 
partnership.  For decades the Democracy articulated a negative vision which the party platform 
constantly reiterated in the phrase, “the Federal Government is one of limited powers.”  The 
young Democrats opened the door for positive action and legislation with Manifest Destiny 
acting, unintentionally, as a justification.  Expansion, and the attempt to annex Cuba, involved 
positive action: circumventing the Constitution to annex Texas, threatening war with Britain for 
all of Oregon, prosecuting an offensive war against Mexico, and either purchasing or seizing 
Cuba.  This was not O‟Sullivan‟s vision of an apparent destiny peacefully progressing towards 
fulfillment, but an aggressive exercise of government power towards a specified end.  By 1861, 
the South had witnessed the benefit of government power and inverted young Democrats‟ model: 
national interests drew on state interests which responded to powerful local interests such as 
slavery.  Sectionalism grew out of nationalist policy. 
Beneath starlight at 4:30 am on April 12, 1861, South Carolina‟s sons began the Southern 
War for Independence.  Within thirty-three hours, Confederate cannons had created a mass of 
rubble under which Young America‟s Manifest Destiny lay buried.  The rebels raised the flag of 
fallen stars above battered Fort Sumter as a salute to Providence for bestowing its favor on the 
Confederacy.  The Confederacy had resolved the paradox of Manifest Destiny which plagued the 
old Union for the past seventeen years.  There would be no more contradiction in expanding 





Confederacy would be a slave owner‟s kingdom on Earth, just as Young America had spoken of 
North America as a dominion of freedom in the preceding years.  And so a new nation dedicated 
to the idea that all men are not created equal went to war confident that no weapon formed 
against it could prevail.
177
  Yet, the claim of divine support blinded the Confederacy, like its 
predecessor, to a vital truth.  Providence stood aloof. 
                                                          
177
 “„No weapon that is formed against thee shall prosper; and every tongue that shall rise against thee in judgment 
thou shalt condemn. This is the heritage of the servants of the LORD, and their righteousness is of me,‟ saith the 
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